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I. INTRODUCTION
In contrast to the workers' compensation law of virtually all
other states, the Pennsylvania law regarding an injured worker's
"partial disability" status and right to vocational rehabilitation is
governed exclusively by court cases. This development is remarka-
ble given the evolution of workers' compensation laws in other ju-
risdictions, which have uniformly provided for vocational rehabili-
tation programs by way of statute' as this effort has become
recognized as an essential element of a worker's right of recovery
for his or her work-related injury. The legal determination of an
injured worker's entitlement to partial, as opposed to total, disabil-
ity is also usually governed by statute.'
Both developments, which are inextricably related, are the result
of legislative default. Without legislative guidance on the issue,
Pennsylvania courts in the 1930s began to generate the rule that
workers possessing significant residual physical impairment could
only be reduced to a partial disability status upon a showing by
the employer that "suitable work" was available and "within his
reach."' 3 After a half-century of comment on and development of
this job availability rule, the courts seized upon this doctrine, al-
tered it, and-in lieu of any legislatively prescribed pro-
gram-judicially instituted a program of rudimentary vocational
1. As of January, 1992, only a handful of states, including Pennsylvania, omitted
vocational rehabilitation programs from their statutory workmen's compensation laws. See
generally Chancy Croft, Something More Important Than Money-Vocational Rehabilita-
tion in Workers' Compensation Cases, 3 Alaska L Rev 49, 94-124 (1986). See also Ruth C.
Vance, Vocational Rehabilitation Benefits under Indiana's Workers' Compensation Law,
24 Valparaiso L Rev 255 (1990) (arguing for comprehensive new vocational rehabilitation
statute for Indiana workmen's compensation law).
2. See US Chamber of Commerce, 1991 Analysis of Workers Compensation Laws
18-21 (1991).
3. Consona v R.E. Coulborn & Co., 104 Pa Super 170, 158 A 300 (1931). See Unora v




This long-term case development of a crucial, substantive aspect
of the law is a phenomenon worthy of study, not only for its histor-
ical uniqueness but because of pragmatic necessity. It is submitted
that, without some working familiarity with the leading cases and
background of the judicially created rules, the participant in the
workers' compensation system will not be able to assess reliably
the rights and remedies of both employer and worker.
The reality that an entire aspect of the law is found in the court
precedents raises a number of significant issues. First, this sub-
merged character of the law makes the rules governing partial disa-
bility and vocational rehabilitation virtually inaccessible to the
non-lawyer community of employers and employees for whom the
workers' compensation laws were enacted and are administered. It
is, of course, wholly appropriate that courts interpret the law in
this and other areas and thus add to the substantive law.5 Still, the
lack of any legislatively prescribed, easily referred-to positive code
or set of regulations precludes even the hope that quick and relia-
ble reference can be made by the lay public to this crucial aspect
of the law. The absence of any such codification of at least the
basics is especially inappropriate in the field of workers' compensa-
tion, in which a pervasive goal has been to minimize court battles
and the excessive involvement of lawyers.6
Second, notwithstanding the general excellence of Pennsylvania
appellate courts, the multiple declarations of the courts with re-
gard to the law of partial disability and vocational rehabilitation
have not always been consistent,7 are at times confusing,8 and oc-
casionally are contradictory.9 This fact makes the law even less ac-
cessible to the non-lawyer community, breeds litigation and the
over-involvement of lawyers, and disrupts the ability of even so-
phisticated individuals and entities to assess rights and remedies
4. King Fifth Wheel Co. v WCAB (Rhodes), 79 Pa Commw 300, 468 A2d 1211
(1983). See Kachinski v WCAB (Vepco Constr. Co.), 91 Pa Commw 543, 498 A2d 36 (1985),
aff'd, 516 Pa 240, 532 A2d 374 (1987).
5. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law 4-5 (Harvard Univ.
Press, 1988).
6. Donald T. DeCarlo & Martin Minkowitz, Workers' Compensation Insurance and
Law Practice 4 (LRP Publications, 1989). Of course, it is nonetheless true that workmen's
compensation is a legal system and the appropriate involvement of attorneys is both in-
tended and inevitable. See Irvin Stander, Guide to Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation
41-42 (Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 1978).
7. See notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
8. See notes 319-20 and accompanying text.
9. See notes 134-38 and accompanying text; notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
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and plan for the future with confidence.
Third, and on a different level of analysis, the somewhat free-
wheeling case law development of these two related aspects of the
law has resulted in what are, it is submitted, undesirable substan-
tive results. Two such results immediately stand out.
The commonwealth court in the 1980s, for example, pushed the
law of job availability dangerously close to a program requiring
employers to be virtual insurers, for all times, of employment for
partially disabled workers. The court, in this regard, began to de-
mand that an employer reinstate a worker-whose benefits had
been suspended upon the return to work-on total disability, once
he suffered a renewed loss of earnings. This was so even when it
was undisputed that the proximate cause of the loss of earnings
was not the worker's residual disability, but instead such things as
economic downturn or layoff. While this rule perhaps made sense
for workers who could only return to modified work, the court de-
manded that this rule apply even where the worker had returned
to his time-of-injury job.10 Only by offering new work, or finding it
for the worker, could the employer again reduce its liability. Work-
men's compensation thus approached unemployment
compensation.
This development was solely the result of carefully considered
yet nonetheless errant interpretation of decades and layers of court
precedents. While this trend of court decisions has apparently
been undercut recently by the supreme courtl-a sensible devel-
opment-it is safe to say that the case law would never have been
generated were there some legislative guidance on the simple issue
of job availability and a laid-off worker's entitlement to benefits.
The other substantive development subject to criticism is the ju-
dicially constructed and mandated program of vocational rehabili-
tation itself. Only praise can be afforded the commonwealth court
and the chief architect of the program, Senior Judge Alexander F.
Barbieri, for initially instituting such a program through judicial
activism 2 in light of the legislature's total neglect of this aspect of
workmen's compensation. Nevertheless, the constraints of judicial
lawmaking have generated a vocational rehabilitation system
which is no substitute for a legislatively mandated, comprehensive
program.
10. Fells v WCAB (Caterpillar Tractor Co.), 122 Pa Commw 399, 552 A2d 334
(1988).
11. Pieper v Ametek-Thermox Instruments Div., 526 Pa 25, 584 A2d 301 (1990).
12. See notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
1992
Duquesne Law Review
There is, for example, still no entity within the Bureau of Work-
ers' Compensation responsible for the implementation or even
mere monitoring of vocational rehabilitation. Further, there is no
ability on the part of an injured worker to initiate the rehabilita-
tion process-all control over the process is in the hands of the
employer and its insurance carrier. Finally, the rules and nuances
of the court-created program, as set forth in the cases, are found in
a myriad number of cases which must become mastered by law-
yers, rehabilitation counselors and job finders. This process tends
to misdirect valuable dollars away from constructive programs to
rehabilitate injured workers and into the treasuries of these service
providers.
These problems, plainly, can only be addressed by affirmative
action by the legislature.
Despite these complaints, the case law doctrines of partial disa-
bility and vocational rehabilitation have reached a plateau, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court having spoken in coherent terms on
both related issues. The landmark case of Kachinski v WCAB
(Vepco Const. Co.),13 which is now well-known to most individuals
involved in the workers' compensation system, was filed in 1987
and set forth what were purported to be "concrete guidelines" for
employer and employee to follow in the process of vocational reha-
bilitation. While many twists have since been placed upon these
guidelines by the commonwealth court, it is nevertheless true that
the Kachinski decision still stands as the reference point for all
subsequent decision-making.
In a more recent case, Pieper v Ametek-Thermox Instruments
Division,14 the supreme court addressed the partial disability ques-
tion and decided when the employer was obliged to demonstrate
"job availability" or undertake vocational rehabilitation. The court
largely affirmed the many commonwealth court precedents which
enforced a "presumption of continuing disability" on the part of
workers who have returned to work at light duty or at created jobs,
and ratified the commonwealth court's position that, when such a
worker again loses earning power, job total disability must be rein-
stated-whatever the cause of the loss of work-unless actual
availability of work is shown. Settling a disputed issue, however,
the court insisted that if a worker has returned to work on a sus-
pension to the time-of-injury job, at full duty, the claimant must
13. 516 Pa 240, 532 A2d 374 (1987).
14. 526 Pa 25, 584 A2d 301 (1990).
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demonstrate that the renewed loss of earnings is actually accompa-
nied by continued physical problems from the work injury.15 By so
doing, of course, the supreme court has seemingly undercut the
commonwealth court's demand that employers become virtual in-
surers, for all time, of employment for partially disabled workers.
This article seeks to chronicle and analyze the development of
the related case law doctrines of partial disability and vocational
rehabilitation, which can be characterized generically as the "avail-
ability of work doctrine," and which are dominated most recently
by the Kachinski and Pieper cases.
This article first treats the historical development of the "availa-
bility of work" doctrine from its roots in the 1930s up until the
present time. As will be seen, within the last ten years or so the
cases begin to fall into two categories-one set dealing with the
specific burdens on the employer with regard to how to show job
availability, 6 and the other dealing with when job availability
must be shown.' 7 The cases dealing with the former burden have
become increasingly complex, as "job availability" changed from a
theoretical concept to one with specific requirements of employers
to provide work or realistic job referrals to workers. It is these
cases which together comprise the law of "vocational rehabilita-
tion" in Pennsylvania.
The latter category of cases can also be referred to as "burden of
proof" cases,' 8 as they address the issue of when the employer has
the burden of providing to a worker a conforming job, or otherwise
putting the case in a vocational rehabilitation mode. This article
thereafter seeks to set forth the positive law in both of these areas,
with special emphasis on the many cases which have meticulously
characterized what the employer must do to effectively demon-
strate a worker's change to partial disability, and how the compen-
sation claimant is expected to respond.' 9
Finally, this article addresses the lack in Pennsylvania of any
formal vocational rehabilitation provision within its workmen's
compensation law. Such provisions were announced as mandatory
in any effective compensation program by the National Commis-
15. Pieper, 584 A2d at 305.
16. See notes 94-258 and accompanying text.
17. See notes 259-322 and accompanying text.
18. See Alexander F. Barbieri, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation § 5.14(1) at
38-40 (George T. Bisel Co., 1974 & 1991 Supp).
19. See notes 94-322 and accompanying text.
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sion on Workmen's Compensation Laws in 1972,0 and virtually all
states now have such a provision. This article provides suggestions
for a statute in this regard and discusses the operation of such laws
in other jurisdictions.2
As suggested above, the intent of this article is chiefly to set
forth the current law of the availability of work doctrine and to
explain historically how it came to be generated by the courts.
While the author also sets forth thoughts with respect to the po-
tential for a statutory vocational rehabilitation provision, this arti-
cle does not include a hard recommendation for the full parame-
ters of such a law. Such a recommendation should only follow an
empirical study of the need for such a law, how it is likely to be
administered and utilized in the Commonwealth, and what costs
are involved. Plainly, however, the fact that the immense body of
judge-made law treated here even exists points up the noticeable
omission from the Pennsylvania Act of a key inclusion of any mod-
ern workmen's compensation statute.
II. THE AVAILABILITY OF WORK DOCTRINE: BRIEFLY DEFINED
As discussed above, the availability of work doctrine has impact
on both the issues of when a worker may be reduced from total to
partial disability, and the employee's ability to secure vocational
rehabilitation services.
In briefest summary, the current law is as follows. An employer
paying total disability workmen's compensation is only entitled to
an order of partial disability-reduction ("modification") or sus-
pension of payments-after demonstrating: (1) that the claimant
has physically become able to do some occupational category of
work, and (2) that work within such category, and within the
worker's vocational restrictions, is actually available to the
worker.22 "Actually available," since the early 1980s, has meant
20. See Report of National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws
82-83 (1972).
21. See notes 335-73 and accompanying text.
22. Kachinski v WCAB (Vepco Constr. Co.), 516 Pa 240, 532 A2d 374 (1987).
Once actual job availability is shown, partial disability is payable, either by order or
agreement, pursuant to Section 306(b) of the Act, which provides, in pertinent part:
For disability partial in character [the claimant shall receive] sixty-six and two-thirds
percentum of the difference between the [average weekly wage] of the employe ...
and the earning power of the employe thereafter; but such compensation shall not be
more than the maximum compensation payable. This compensation shall be paid




that the worker has actually been referred a then-open job, and
has either returned to such work or has refused or otherwise failed,
without good cause, to return to or attempt the referred work.23
Importantly, there is no purely medical or theoretical analysis
with regard to an individual's partial disability under the Pennsyl-
vania Workmen's Compensation Act. Accordingly, a physician's
opinion that the claimant is, for example, only "25% disabled" is
meaningless under the Pennsylvania Act. The percentage must be
converted to pragmatic restrictions, and a job within those limita-
tions and within the worker's vocational capabilities must be re-
ferred to the worker. Likewise, localized market analyses of the
area job market for sedentary jobs are ineffective in Pennsylvania
without effectively referring such jobs to the injured worker in
question.
The burden of showing "job availability," and thus of showing
partial disability, is on the employer in virtually all contexts. The
scenario indicated above is the most familiar, with the employer
actively seeking to reduce the benefits of the worker drawing total
disability. 24 The burden is present, however, in other cases as well.
For example, if a worker has returned to work at modified duty, a
presumption of continuing disability exists which entitles the
worker to a virtual automatic reinstatement of benefits when he or
77 Pa Stat Ann § 512 (Purdon 1992). Thus, a worker with an average weekly wage of $300
who returns to work earning $200-or sacrifices the opportunity to work at this rate-is
entitled to two-thirds the difference, or $66.66 per week. When the demonstrated earning
power is in excess of the average weekly wage, the claimant's benefits are deemed "sus-
pended." Jasper v WCAB (Teledyne), 498 Pa 263, 445 A2d 1212 (1982); Ede v Ruhe Motor
Corp., 184 Pa Super 603, 136 A2d 151 (1957).
A worker with a substantial average weekly wage, for example $1000, who returns to a job
or otherwise has earning power of $200, will not be entitled to two-thirds the difference,
since, using 1992 figures, two-thirds of the difference is in excess of the maximum compen-
sation payable, or $455. The worker will thus labor at his pay of $200 per week and continue
to receive benefits at his total disability rate. The effect of the finding that the claimant has
"earning power," however, is that the claimant is deemed partially disabled and is entitled
to such benefits for five hundred weeks. This puts a "cap" on liability when compared to the
total disability benefit, which lasts for the "duration of the disability." Section 306(a) of the
Act, 77 Pa Stat Ann § 511 (Purdon 1992).
A claimant with a substantial average weekly wage can also ignore job referrals with mod-
est wages with impunity and suffer no immediate sacrifice of benefits. This phenomenon can
stand in the way of good faith vocational rehabilitation and placement efforts under the
Kachinski regime.
23. Id. See also King Fifth Wheel, 468 A2d 1211 (1983); notes 82-114 and accompa-
nying text.




she again experiences a loss of wages.2 5 Only upon a showing, once
again, of an available job, will the employer be entitled to reduce
the claimant's benefits to partial disability.
Similarly, if the claimant's initial application for benefits is de-
nied, and the employee remains off from work in the course of liti-
gation, the claimant will be entitled to an ongoing award of total
disability benefits if there has been no intervening offer of con-
forming work.26
It is not surprising that a court-mandated "vocational rehabilita-
tion" was generated out of this legal framework. The most basic
form of vocational rehabilitation is, after all, simply locating a job
within the worker's current capabilities and directing the individ-
ual to such work. 7 The motivation for this process is obvious
under the above analysis: if an employer must pay the worker total
disability until he or she secures work or is shown to have real
earning power, the employer will eventually try to direct the
worker back to work.
In many cases such simple "job finding" will be the beginning
and end of all rehabilitation attempts under the Pennsylvania law,
since there is no statute to demand any more of an employer. In
other cases, however, an employer will expend greater energies and
explore more exotic forms of rehabilitation-coaching for inter-
viewing, outplacement, retraining, other education-if it is deemed
necessary to demonstrate that the worker has restored earning
capacity.
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE "AvAILABILITY OF WORK"
DOCTRINE
Without exception, all of the basic rules cited in the prior sec-
tion were generated from court decisions. The heritage of these
rules is quite ancient, with the genesis of the doctrine traceable to
court cases of the 1930s. An understanding of this heritage is im-
portant for a complete appreciation of the modern rules.
25. See Busche v WCAB (Townsend & Bottum, Inc.), 77 Pa Commw 469, 466 A2d
278 (1983).
26. See Petrone v Moffat Coal Co., 427 Pa 5, 233 A2d 891 (1967).
27. See, for example, Comment, Vocational Rehabilitation in the Workers' Compen-
sation System, 33 Ark L Rev 723, 728 (1980).
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A. The Law of "Nondescript" Disability and the Presumption of
Job Availability
The relevant roots of the modern availability of work doctrine
are found in the earlier law of "nondescript" disability.2 8 This
term, virtually forgotten in contemporary practice, was described
only twenty years ago as one reflecting an "integral part of the dis-
ability law of Pennsylvania in workmen's compensation cases.
'29
The "nondescript" type of total disability as a judicial doctrine is
important because it was the original judge-made doctrine which
demanded a showing of job availability:
[The term "nondescript"] started simply as a designation of one who, while
not totally incapacitated under ordinary standards of disability, still had
such elements of disability as residuals following his injury that he was una-
ble to compete for employment on the open labor market. In other words, if
a job had to be fashioned for him, then he was a "nondescript" on the open
labor market, and in such case was entitled to continuation of total disabil-
ity benefits.
3 0
In such cases, the employer had the burden of proof and could
only gain an order of partial disability upon a showing that suita-
ble work within the nondescript limitations was available.3' "Avail-
able suitable work" in the case of a worker with nondescript disa-
bility was not considered in the abstract. The employer would
literally have to provide a specially created job to the individual in
such cases to establish entitlement to partial disability.
32
The "nondescript" form of disability was distinguished from the
disability of a worker who had recovered enough to do modified
work of a general nature. In these cases, there was no burden on
the employer of showing an available modified job, and "the em-
ployer could meet his burden to reduce his liability from total to
partial simply by offering evidence of any percentage of improve-
ment, however minor, even while admitting that he would not or
could not reemploy the disabled employe.' 3 3 Importantly, the ini-
28. See William A. Skinner, 1 Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation 430-439"
(George T. Bisel Co., 3d ed 1938); Barbieri, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation § 5.14
et seq at 38-40 (cited in note 18).
29. Barbieri, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation § 5.14 et seq at 38 (cited in
note 18).
30. Id.
31. See, for example, Jones v Hayle Brook Coal Co., 119 Pa Super 409, 411, 179 A
783, 784 (1935).
32. Interview with Raymond F. Keisling, Esquire (Feb 21, 1992).
33. Barbieri, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation § 5.14 at 40 (cited in note 18).
See Petrone v Moffat Coal Co., 208 Pa Super 239, 222 A2d 416 (1966), rev'd, 427 Pa 5, 233
1992 525
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tial interpretation of the law did not recognize this dichotomy.3 4
It is generally accepted that the first appellate case to herald the
nondescript doctrine, and demand a showing of job availability,
was the superior court's decision in Consona v R.E. Coulborn &
Co.3s In that case, the claimant had suffered a number of serious
facial wounds and sought reinstatement of compensation after dif-
ficulty in attempting return to work. There was evidence of record
on some level of earning capacity, as the claimant had actually la-
bored since the injury in a mushroom house.3 "
The employer argued that this objective evidence of restoration
of earning capacity should preclude an award of reinstated total
disability, notwithstanding the claimant's inability to perform
steady light work. This argument was rejected by the superior
court in the following often-repeated language, which established
the "nondescript" rule and the dichotomy summarized above:
The evidence indicates that the claimant can, at irregular intervals, do some
light work, but of a very limited character. His incapacity is such that it
would not be practicable to expect that he could hold a job. If he were able
uninterruptedly to do light work, it might be presumed that work of that
A2d 891 (1967).
34. Prior to the development of this dichotomy, a certain level of confusion existed
with regard to the determination of a worker's partial disability. Provision for the monetary
entitlement was clear enough, but there was no clear provision for what evidence was neces-
sary to demonstrate that the totally disabled worker had restored "earning capacity" was
now only partially disabled. As in the current law, there was no statutory provision for the
critical test.
One approach, however, was simply to have the physician testify with regard to his opin-
ion concerning the worker's earning capacity given his physical capabilities or estimated
percentage of loss. This method was gravely questioned in its time and was subject to sharp
criticism by the contemporary leading authority. See Skinner, 1 Pennsylvania Workmen's
Compensation at 424-30 (cited in note 28). The approach endorsed by Skinner, in all cases
where the allegation had been made that an employee's disability had changed from total to
partial, was to treat the issue of whether an employee had "earning capacity" as a factual
one, based upon the referee's consideration of certain facts:
To arrive at a "conclusion" or to express an opinion on the question of what the
earning power of any partially disabled person is and to what extent that represents a
loss when compared to wages earned before the accident would involve necessarily
the consideration of two or three elements which must be considered in forming an
opinion: (1) The physical ability to work and the character of the work the person
could perform in his impaired condition. (2) The wages customarily paid in the vicin-
ity for the character of work he is to perform. (3) The wages earned before the acci-
dent and while the person was supposedly 100% efficient.
Id at 427. The practice of using physicians alone, however, to render opinions as to partial
disability continued until the commonwealth court began to define the elements of job avail-
ability in the 1970s and 1980s.
35. 104 Pa Super 170, 158 A 300 (1931).
36. Consona, 158 A at 300.
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nature would be available. . . . It is a matter of common knowledge that
there is a general disinclination on the part of employers to give work to
cripples. If suitable work was available to this man with his limitations, it
was incumbent upon the [employer] to show that fact. There was no at-
tempt to assume this burden.37
The Court then cited a collateral authority-later to be as-
sailed-to create the nondescript rule and its corollary:
If the workman is proved able to do light work in general, it may be pre-
sumed that such work is available; but if the injury has left the workman a
"nondescript" in the labor market, unfitted to do even light work of a gen-
eral character, but fitted to do "odd" jobs not generally obtainable, it may
be presumed that there is no work available for him, even though he at-
tempted to find such.. . . If the workman is left a nondescript, prima facie
he is unable to obtain suitable employment, and so long as this presumption
remains not overturned the workman is entitled to compensation for total
incapacity.38
This basic dichotomy essentially remained in place until 1967.39
In the meantime, multiple decisions were generated by the supe-
rior court which ratified the Consona case and clarified that this
was, indeed, the law.40 Attempts to extend the employer's responsi-
bility of showing job availability beyond the nondescript context,
however, were resisted. The superior court, in this regard, consist-
ently sustained the reasoning of the "nondescript" cases, but re-
fused to require employers to show job availability in every case
where it was alleged that the worker "cannot compete in the open
labor market.""'
37. Id (emphasis added).
38. Id at 300-01, quoting Annotation, Workmens' Compensation: Statutory phrase
"incapacity for work" or the like, as including inability to obtain work following an injury,
33 ALR 122 (1924).
39. See notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
40. See, for example, Nagel v McDonald Mining Co., 150 Pa Super 527, 28 A2d 805
(1942); Earley v Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 144 Pa Super 301, 19 A2d 615
(1941); Jones v Hayle Brook Coal Co., 119 Pa Super 409, 179 A 783 (1935). See also Cox v
Woodlands Cemetery Co., 133 Pa Super 313, 2 A2d 565 (1938). The Earley case is usually
pointed to as the most influential of the cases in establishing the "presumption of job avail-
ability," as it expanded on Consona and held that where a worker is able to steadily perform
light work, "it is presumed that such work is available, and that one can procure it." Ear-
ley, 19 A2d at 617 (emphasis added).
41. See, for example, Forsythe v Harrison Twp., 157 Pa Super 433, 43 A2d 366
(1945); Allen v Dravo Corp., 149 Pa Super 188, 27 A2d 491 (1942); Conley v Allegheny Co.,
131 Pa Super 236, 200 A2d 287 (1938).
Only where the claimant was shown to be a nondescript would the presumption of non-
availability of work apply. A claimant could not demonstrate his status as a nondescript
merely by showing he allegedly could not compete on the open job market. To the contrary:
To bring the claimant within the classification of a "nondescript," it must be shown
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Importantly, throughout this period a distinction was drawn be-
tween the ability to work and the ability to procure a job. In this
regard, it was the capacity to work, not the ability to apply and be
considered by an actual employer, that controlled. In the superior
court's words, "The Compensation Act is not designed to afford
insurance against unemployment, and the fact that work is not
procurable does not prove that a man is not capable of performing
it. It is the ability by which the question is determined.
42
Some twenty-three years after the genesis of the "nondescript"
doctrine and of the corresponding rule that a presumption of
availability of work exists with regard to other partially disabled
workers, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally ratified the di-
chotomy. This ratification came about in the celebrated case of
Unora v Glen Alden Coal Co.,4" a case which is typically cited as
the source of the judge-made law of job availability. The case is
justly remembered both for the colorful language employed by its
author, Justice Musmanno, and for its invocation of Professor Lar-
son's view of disability as being a concept necessarily implicating
both physical and vocational factors.
The facts of the case were unremarkable. Three coal miner-
claimants in the consolidated appeal had been refused disability
benefits, as the testifying physicians would only say that the min-
ers were partially disabled, based upon an assessment of their
medical condition only.44 At that time, compensation for disease
was only payable for total disability and hence the workers were
left without any recovery.
This result was considered intolerable by the supreme court,
which remanded for a consideration of whether, with their level of
impairment, they were able to be employed. In the supreme court's
view, the physicians had rendered their opinion that the workers
were only partially disabled "on the false premise that total disa-
bility under the act is strictly and exclusively a medical . .. [or]
physiological fact.' ' 45 In the court's view, "total disability . .. in
that his injuries prevent him from getting employment by reason of the fact that his
condition disqualifies him. To sustain such a claim, the claimant must show that
there is no source of permanent employment available to a man who is under the
disadvantage he suffers.
Skinner, 1 Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation at 426 (cited in note 28).
42. Yednock v Hazle Brook Coal Co., 109 Pa Super 182, 167 A 236, 237 (1933) (em-
phasis in original).
43. 377 Pa 7, 104 A2d 104 (1954).
44. Unora, 104 A2d at 105-06.
45. Id at 106-07.
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the nomenclature of workmen's compensation proceedings imports
economic as well as physical findings." Quoting Larson, the court
stated:
The disability concept is a blend of two ingredients. . . [T]he first ingredi-
ent is disability on the medical or physical sense, as evidenced by obvious
loss of members or by medical testimony that the claimant simply cannot
make the necessary muscular movements and exertions; the second ingredi-
ent is de facto inability to earn wages . . . The proper balancing of the
medical and wage-loss factors, is, then, the essence of the "disability" prob-
lem in workmen's compensation.
4
6
The court then imposed its own "nondescript" rule-though
avoiding the use of that word-in the following language, at the
same time pointing out and citing the longstanding "nondescript"
line of cases:
47
The determination of total disability is one which requires a consideration
and weighing (in addition to the anatomical facts) of such factors as the
claimant's mental outlook, his industrial background, his education, the oc-
cupation, if any, he could perform where his particular physical impairment
would not be a total bar, and whether such work exists. Where the injured
person can handle only a specially-created job, one light of effort and re-
sponsibility but laden with rest and comfort (employment plums that do
not often dangle from the trees of everyday economics) the burden is on
the defendant-employer to show that such a job is in fact within reach. If
proof of that fact is not presented, the claimant is then entitled to a find-
ing of total disability.
48
Under this newly regenerated rule, the presumption of availa-
bility of work continued with regard to workers who had been
cleared for general work of a modified or light-duty nature.
Promptly after Unora, for example, the superior court held that, in
a case where the accepted medical evidence was that an injured
worker was "capable of steadily performing certain types of light
work," it is "presumed that such work is available, and that one
can procure it."
'49
During this period, as before, employers would typically rely on
the opinion of physicians with regard to the ability of workers to
do steady light work. Because of the presumption of availability of
such work, of course, vocational experts were not usually involved
46. Id at 107, quoting Arthur Larson, 2 Workmen's Compensation Law § 57.11 at 10-
12 (Matthew Bender, 1989).
47. Unora, 104 A2d at 107 n 3.
48. Id at 107.
49. Sorby v Three Rivers Motors, 178 Pa Super 187, 114 A2d 347, 350 (1955). See
also Cohen v Doubleday & Co., 191 Pa Super 106, 155 A2d 378 (1959).
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in the process. This procedure was considered in its time appropri-
ate under the rule set forth in Unora.50
B. Overthrow of the Presumption of Job Availability and Doc-
trine of Nondescript Disability
The long-standing dichotomy discussed above-the presumption
that work is not available for a nondescript, but available for a
worker cleared for general light work-came to an end in 1967 in
the landmark case of Petrone v Moffat Coal Co.5' The claimant
was a coal miner who had labored in the anthracite mines for
thirty-three years and had contracted anthracosilicosis. The medi-
cal opinions in the case as to the level of his disability were con-
flicting, but the medical testimony accepted by the fact-finder was
to the effect that the claimant "could perform light work of a gen-
eral nature such as operating an elevator or a power lawn mower,"
and that the "claimant could perform light work of a general na-
ture including 'many jobs inside of the mines' although he would
not advise that.
'52
The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (hereinafter "the
Board") and the superior court, finding this evidence credible, du-
tifully followed the half-century of precedent:
An employee who can perform light work of a general nature but cannot
do so steadily and uninterruptedly, who has been disabled by occupational
disease is also entitled to compensation for total disability.... However,
where, as in the instant case, a claimant suffering from occupational disease
is able to perform light work of a general nature, as distinguished from work
of a specialized nature, continuously and steadily, it is presumed that such
work is available and the.claimant is not totally disabled within the mean-
ing of the Act. ... 53
Accordingly, the denial of benefits was upheld.
In the supreme court, this ruling was reversed and the entire
presumption of available work overthrown. Prefacing the decision
with memorable prose," as he had done in the Unora decision,
50. See, for example, Purnell v Wolffe, 204 Pa Super 211, 203 A2d 511 (1964) (em-
ployer argued that partial disability should be ordered based solely on doctor's medical
opinion); Mueny v Kelso Beach Improvement Assoc., 181 Pa Super 105, 124 A2d 153 (1956)
(employer sought to demonstrate partial disability based solely on doctor's medical
opinion).
51. 427 Pa 5, 233 A2d 891 (1967).
52. Petrone v Moffat Coal Co., 208 Pa Super 239, 222 A2d 416, 417 (1966), rev'd, 427
Pa 5, 233 A2d 891 (1967).
53. Petrone, 222 A2d at 417 (emphasis added).
54. Petrone, 233 A2d at 892:
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Justice Musmanno declared the following:
This is a strange presumption. How does the fact that a person is capable of
performing light work guarantee that light work is available? . . "A pre-
sumption should always be based upon a fact, and should be a reasonable
and natural deduction from that fact.".
The presumption spoken of by the Superior Court . . . is so unnatural
and illogical that one wonders how it ever found a footing in the law ...
The original false step . . . was apparently taken in the case of Consona
It would appear that the opinion writer in that case was led into this
fallacious [presumption] by [reliance upon the authority of a collateral
text], where the. . writer was discussing something else, namely, the ques-
tion as to who has the burden of proof to show that suitable employment is
in fact available.
55
The court then openly overturned the pre-existing law, and ruled
that the presumption was null and void: "If the finding 'capacity to
perform light work' is to mean anything, there must be some evi-
dence that light work exists."56 Further, it was the employer that
had the burden of demonstrating that work was available to the
partially recovered employee:
The law does not require that the claimant must visit every building and
house in the community to inquire if he is needed as an elevator operator or
engineer on a power lawn mower. If light work is available, it is easier for
the defendant to prove its existence than for the claimant to prove its non-
existence.57
Significantly, the court was influenced in so changing the rule, and
in ruling on the burden of proof issue, by reference to the practice
in the social security context. The federal cases dealing with that
law "adopt the rule that when a claimant is found physically capa-
ble of performing light work of a general character, the burden
should be on the party from whom compensation is sought to show
When Joseph P. Petrone was thirteen years of age, the economic straits of his family
drove him into the anthracite mines of Lackawanna County. After toiling for thirty-
three years in the depths of the earth, extracting one of nature's most useful miner-
als, Petrone found his strength ebbing, his step faltering, and his lungs clogging. He
soon learned that he was doomed by the fate which has caught up with countless coal
miners. Anthracosilicosis had taken up dread habitation in his chest. He could not
work-his days as a coal miner were over.
Id.
55. Id at 893-94.
56. Id at 893.
57. Id at 895.
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that such work is available to the claimant. '5 8
The Petrone decision was truly a landmark in the case law doc-
trine of job availability. With this development it became plain
that evidence of the availability of work was required in all cases
where the claimant possessed a residual disability. The fundamen-
tal distinction between "nondescript" disability and general disa-
bility became irrelevant.
It should be recalled, however, that at this juncture "availability
of work" was still considered in the abstract. Notwithstanding the
requirement of showing the availability of work, there was no re-
quirement that the existence of such work had to be communi-
cated to the worker. Cases decided after Petrone in the 1970s and
early 1980s consistently insisted that the task of showing job avail-
ability did not require that the worker be aware of the work or
receive an actual offer of employment.5 1
The Petrone case was followed quickly by yet another landmark
case on the law of job availability, Barrett v Otis Elevator Co.6 Its
ultimate holding has had longstanding effect on the burden of
proof issue in showing job availability.
The claimant in Barrett had filed a claim petition, and the medi-
cal evidence ultimately found credible indicated that the claimant
was indeed disabled from his regular rigorous work. His disability,
however, had been characterized as "40%," with no attention being
paid to job availability-no determination had been made as to
whether the claimant was able to do light work of a general nature,
as had been the usual practice. 1
The claimant had been found partially disabled, and he chal-
lenged this finding in the supreme court in light of the Petrone
case. The employer had argued that Petrone was not applicable in
light of the percentage finding of disability which, in its view, could
be interpreted as conclusive with regard to a finding of partial, as
opposed to total, disability. 2
This argument was rejected, with the court pointing to the deci-
sions in Unora and Petrone,63 which had both stressed the impor-
58. Id (Roberts concurring). The presumption of job availability had also been
sharply attacked by the superior court itself shortly before the Petrone decision. See Kirk v
L. Bauer, Jr., Inc., 209 Pa Super 357, 228 A2d 228 (1967). This case was probably influential
in the supreme court's subsequent overthrow of the doctrine.
59. See notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
60. 431 Pa 446, 246 A2d 668 (1968).
61. Barrett, 246 A2d at 670.
62. Id at 671.
63. Id at 672, 674.
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tance of the role of vocational factors in the determination of disa-
bility. In this case, the court pointed out, the claimant had shown
that he could not do his regular work and this assertion had been
found believable by the fact-finder. As no showing of job availabil-
ity had been undertaken by the employer, the claimant was to be
considered totally disabled:
We hold that, once the claimant has discharged his burden of proving that,
because of his injury, he is unable to do the type of work he was engaged in
when injured, the employer has the burden of proving that other work is
available to the claimant which he is capable of obtaining.
8
6
As will be seen, this holding as to allocation of the burden of
proof has had tremendous effect on subsequent decisions, and the
basic rule certainly survives at the present time.
The new rulings of Petrone and Barrett were revolutionary in
their era, as reflected by Judge Barbieri in his treatise. Writing in
1972, he pointed out that:
While these small burden of proof changes may not seem to be of major
significance because of their purely procedural character, the increase in the
benefit responsibilities of employers and their insurance carriers is quite re-
markable .... Previously, the employer could meet his burden to reduce
his liability from total to partial simply by offering evidence of any percent-
age of improvement, however minor, even while admitting that he would
not or could not reemploy the disabled employe. [This simple showing
would have] the effect of changing the lifetime period of benefit entitlement
at the maximum rate to the partial disability schedule of payments which
are not only in lesser weekly amounts, but for a limited period of time.6
5
The Petrone and Barrett cases were to remain the leading prece-
dents regarding the basic tenets of job availability until the 1987
decision in Kachinski v WCAB (Vepco Constr. Co.).
66
C. Between Barrett and Kachinski
The two landmarks discussed in the prior section established job
availability as a pervasive requirement in the demonstration of
partial disability. As identified by Judge Barbieri, however, these
were essentially burden of proof cases. Precisely how job availabil-
ity was shown had always been a rather inexact art; certainly the
reported appellate court cases fail to reveal any structured pattern.
This inexactitude continued after Petrone and Barrett and existed
64. Id at 674.
65. Barbieri, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation § 5.14 at 40 (cited in note 18).
66. 516 Pa 240, 532 A2d 374 (1987).
1992 533
Duquesne Law Review
until the accession of the Kachinski regime.
Still, in the years following Petrone and Barrett, the case law
did begin to develop a rather demanding set of criteria with regard
to what the employer was to prove to demonstrate job availability.
This development, prompted by the emphasis of Unora and the
cited cases on the importance of vocational factors in the determi-
nation of partial disability, also generated the widespread use of
vocational experts to testify in modification petitions with regard
to the availability of appropriate work in the claimant's particular
geographic area. 7 In lieu of firm guidelines, a variety of ap-
proaches were undertaken by such vocational experts and counsel-
ors. "Market surveys" of sedentary or other modified duty work
were typically requested by employers and insurance carriers with
regard to partially recovered workers.
The large number of cases generated during this period ulti-
mately gave rise to the current supreme court landmark, Kachin-
ski, with its pragmatic recitation of "concrete guidelines" for the
proper demonstration of job availability.
The summarization which follows can be said to constitute the
essential law of job availability of this period. Many of these rules
will be familiar as aspects of the present law, and even remain now
as part of the substantive law. Other aspects, however, are defunct
under the Kachinski regime, and at the time of this writing most
of the cases cited immediately below are no longer recognized as
particularly current authority.
The cases decided immediately after Petrone-now of the newly
created commonwealth court-confirmed that to demonstrate job
availability the employer need not show an actual job offer, nor
was linking the claimant with a job opportunity or sending a job
referral required. For example, job availability was satisfied in one
early case based upon the testimony of the manager of the local
Office of the State Bureau of Employment Security that there were
"fourteen positions [in the area] which perhaps claimant could
fill. 16 8 In this and similar cases, testimony from a vocational spe-
cialist as to the simple availability of open jobs was considered ad-
equate testimony; an offer of employment or communication of the
existence of the work was simply not required."9
67. See, for example, Dumm v WCAB, 42 Pa Commw 594, 401 A2d 415 (1979);
Valadez v Pennsylvania School Bd. Ass'n, 28 Pa Commw 618, 369 A2d 503 (1977); Don-
Mark Realty Co. v Milovec, 11 Pa Commw 448, 314 A2d 349 (1974).
68. Ruffsdale Coal Co. v Matrunics, 6 Pa Commw 420, 295 A2d 629, 629 (1972).
69. Compare also Chamberlain Corp. v Pastellak, 7 Pa Commw 425, 298 A2d 273
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Reflecting the uncertainty during this period of the complete
meaning of job availability, the commonwealth court also held that
the employer need not show that the "available jobs" were even
open for application. In one case, indeed, the employer sought to
establish job availability with a market survey which did not in-
clude in its essential analysis whether the identified jobs were va-
cant and in need of filling. This was found acceptable by both the
Board and the commonwealth court, which affirmed the modifica-
tion of claimant's benefits:
[Here] a witness, qualified . . . as a rehabilitation psychologist and voca-
tional rehabilitation specialist, testified that suitable jobs for the claimant
existed in the local job market and specified a number of these positions as
well as some of these companies willing to hire disabled persons. We believe
that this testimony was sufficient. We do not believe that the employer was
required under Barrett v Otis Elevator ... to show the existence of specific
job openingsY°
The foregoing approaches to showing job availability during this
period-market surveys of available jobs-were typical and consid-
ered legitimate under Petrone. The totally abstract approach to
showing job availability, however, achieved by having an expert
testify as to the claimant's presumed ability to do a number of the-
oretically available jobs, was disapproved by the commonwealth
court. In 4156 Bar Corp. v WCAB,7 1 the employer's expert had ad-
ministered a number of tests to the claimant to determine the
claimant's level of intelligence, his interests and personality, and
then "concluded that the claimant was capable of performing a va-
riety of jobs. 1 7 2 The expert apparently determined that the "avail-
able jobs" were suitable for the worker without a market survey,
and instead simply provided a number of job titles. This process
was considered unacceptable by the referee and the court as re-
flecting proof of job availability. In the court's words, "Merely pro-
viding a list of job titles which appear to be compatible with claim-
ant's condition is not equivalent to establishing the availability of
work the claimant can competently perform.
'73
The court also insisted that a job alleged to be available to the
(1973). See also Don-Mark Realty Co. v Milovec, 11 Pa Commw 448, 314 A2d 349 (1974).
70. Dreher v WCAB, 38 Pa Commw 473, 393 A2d 1081, 1081 (1978). See also RCA
Corp. v WCAB, 46 Pa Commw 411, 406 A2d 588 (1979) (referee committed error in requir-
ing employer to communicate availability of work to claimant).
71. 63 Pa Commw 176, 438 A2d 657 (1981).
72. 4156 Bar Corp., 438 A2d at 659.
73. Id at 659-60.
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claimant be tailored to the "individually disabled worker" in ques-
tion, as opposed to a partially disabled worker in general.7 4 This
approach was driven, appropriately, by the commonwealth court's
reading of Petrone as demanding that the "employer must show
that the claimant is, in fact, employable within the relevant job
market. 17 5 Further, the job had to be available at a time relevant
to the allegations of the claimant's alleged resolution to partial dis-
ability.76 The job or jobs were to be located within the worker's
present general geographic area in order to be considered
available.
77
A claimant was held to be able to rebut a showing of job availa-
bility by actually applying for the job (if this was the manner of
showing job availability being undertaken in his case) and being
rejected,78 or by presenting persuasive testimony that he simply
could not do the tasks of the job purportedly within reach.7 9 A
claimant's subjective displeasure with a proposed job, however, was
deemed irrelevant to the analysis of job availability.80
A separate, but related, line of cases also grew out of Petrone
and Barrett. These cases continued to deal with the issue of when
job availability had to be demonstrated, as opposed to what job
availability consists of and how it is demonstrated. The develop-
ment of these cases is treated in part five of this article."'
D. Immediate Roots of Kachinski: A "Job Available"-Not
Merely a "Job Open"
Although the commonwealth court in the years after Petrone
and Barrett continued to develop a law of job availability, the law,
by any analysis, was not particularly coherent. While there were
favored methods in the trade with regard to what vocational evi-
74. See U.S. Steel Corp. v WCAB, 10 Pa Commw 67, 308 A2d 200 (1973). See also
State Prods. Corp v WCAB, 61 Pa Commw 366, 434 A2d 207 (1981); Parkview Hosp. v
WCAB, 20 Pa Commw 567, 342 A2d 137 (1976); Philadelphia Tramrail Co. v Kennedy, 18
Pa Commw 526, 336 A2d 924 (1975).
75. Philips v North Am. Coal Co., 27 Pa Commw 103, 365 A2d 453, 456 (1976).
76. Jessop Steel Co. v WCAB, 10 Pa Commw 186, 309 A2d 86, 88 (1973). See also
Wenzel v International Petroleum Serv., 60 Pa Commw 141, 430 A2d 1055 (1981).
77. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v WCAB, 32 Pa Commw 147, 377 A2d 1304, 1306
(1977).
78. See WCAB v St. Joseph's Hosp., 52 Pa Commw 265, 415 A2d 957, 958 (1980).
79.. See, for example, WCAB v Universal Cyclops, 20 Pa Commw 261, 341 A2d 223,
225 (1975); Weathergard, Inc. v WCAB, 41 Pa Commw 275, 398 A2d 1103, 1104 (1979).
80. State Prods. Corp. v WCAB, 61 Pa Commw 366, 434 A2d 207, 210 (1981).
81. See notes 259-322 and accompanying text.
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dence should be produced, there was no clear guideline provided
by the court.
One well established rule, however, was that the employer need
not actually show an offer of work. Further, because the court had
held that the employer need not show that the "available" job was
even open for applications, vocational personnel typically did not
undertake to direct actual job referrals, i.e., communication of the
fact of an open, available job to partially rec6vered workers. The
majority view was, certainly, that such efforts were not required
under the law.
This process, now a hallmark of the Kachinski requirements,
was first injected into the law by Senior Judge Barbieri of the com-
monwealth court in King Fifth Wheel Co. v WCAB (Rhodes). 2 In
that case, the employer produced vocational testimony that modi-
fied work was available to the partially recovered claimant, who
apparently was a laborer for a manufacturing concern. The voca-
tional counselor testified that light work within the claimant's re-
strictions was available in the form of a dental lab technician. This
testimony was found credible, and. the referee modified the
worker's benefits. The Board, however, reversed, pointing out that
the employer had failed to show that such work was vocationally
appropriate for the claimant.
This reversal was sustained by the commonwealth court, with
the following critical modification:
[The vocational counselor] testified to a job open and not necessarily availa-
ble. . . . There is no evidence that the job described is available to this
claimant in his state of disability as described by both medical witnesses;
Claimant was never told of the existence of this opening or of any other of
the jobs described by [the vocational counselor] .... 83
The court thus concluded that the employer had failed to meet its
burden of proof on this additional ground.
The apparent addition of this new requirement in showing job
availability was correctly noted as remarkable-and unsupport-
able-by a contemporary commentator:
A marked departure is signified by the court's language suggesting a re-
quirement that the existence of jobs be communicated to the claimant to
satisfy [the employer's] burden. . . . The author respectfully points out
that the court's language, in King Fifth Wheel . . . is not consistent with
the many previous pronouncements by this court that the standard is not
82. 79 Pa Commw 300, 468 A2d 1211 (1983).
83. King Fifth Wheel Co., 468 A2d at 1212 (emphasis added).
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an actual offer of employment, but rather proof of available work.8 '
The commonwealth court purported to support this requirement
by invoking the example of a prior case. In that decision, Living-
ston v WCAB (Upper Yoder Twp.) ,85 the employer chose to prove
the existence of available work by way of an actual job offer sent to
the worker in a mailgram. As the quoted author insists in his criti-
cism, however, the case certainly cannot be read to this day as
precedential authority for imposition of the communication re-
quirement. The commentator is entirely correct in complaining
that, "although such communications can obviously serve as evi-
dence of the existence of available work, there is nothing in the
Livingston opinion which suggests that such communications are
necessary. 8 6 Nevertheless, this requirement became injected in the
pre-Kachinski law of job availability with this remarkable act of
judicial activism.
In the next two years the commonwealth court was to make clear
that the "notice" requirement was a keystone of showing job avail-
ability. The most hotly contested and pivotal case was Backowski
v WCAB (E. W. Tire Co.). 87 In this case the employer challenged
the correctness of King Fifth Wheel, pointing to the fact, as had
the commentator quoted above, that the longstanding rule was
that job availability did not require an actual communication of
the existence of open jobs. Under the strong influence of Judge
Barbieri, the commonwealth court sustained its new rule:
[In this case] there is not one item of testimony indicating that any of the
jobs described were made known to Claimant at any time during the [criti-
cal] period ....
We believe that the form of post hoc revelation of allegedly available em-
ployment in this case has no evidentiary competence to establish the availa-
bility of job opportunities on which the right to compensation can be
vitiated. 8
Reflecting the still maverick aspect of this extension of the law, the
court did not attempt to justify the new requirement by invocation
of its own King Fifth Wheel and Livingston cases. Instead, the
court declared that the only basis for reducing a worker's benefits
84. Peter J. Weber, Annual Survey of Significant Developments in the
Law-Workmen's Compensation, 55 Pa Bar Ass'n Q 148, 157 (1984).
85. 67 Pa Commw 497, 447 A2d 715 (1982).
86. Weber, 55 Pa Bar Ass'n Q at 157 (cited in note 84).
87. 93 Pa Conmmw 339, 503 A2d 58 (1985).
88. Backowski, 503 A2d at 61-62.
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anyway in the context of showing job availability was the worker's
refusal of available light work. The court, in this regard, reasoned
further that a claimant can hardly refuse work and have his bene-
fits reduced when he has never had the job brought to his atten-
tion in the first place. Thus, necessarily, notification of the worker
of the available work is a requirement of showing job availability. 9
While the notice requirement is now taken for granted under
Kachinski and is part of a laudable system, it is nevertheless true
that the foregoing reasoning was an unsatisfactory legal-reasoning
modality for extension of this requirement into the law of showing
job availability. The cases cited in the course of the court's reason-
ing were cases where the employer had chosen on its own to show
job availability by making actual offers or referrals of work and
had been met with refusals by workers. In those cases it was true
indeed that the court would order modification or suspension. °
However, as the commentator complained in the context of the
earlier King Fifth Wheel case, there was no requirement in the
first place that job availability be shown through actual job offers.
The longstanding rule and precedents of the commonwealth court
was that "the standard is not an actual offer of employment, but
rather proof of available work."9' 1 Plainly, what the commonwealth
court did in its King Fifth Wheel and Backowski cases was to ef-
fectively overthrow its prior rulings without wishing to acknowl-
edge the same.92
The court was, in any event, to apply this rule with vigor in sev-
eral other cases93 in the period immediately preceding the acces-
sion of the supreme court's Kachinski regime, which adopted with
vigor the rule of communicating notice of the availability of an
89. Id at 62:
The basis for suspension in a case like this one where partial disability is established,
and admittedly claimant can perform sedentary work, would be the claimant's refusal
to accept available employment. He cannot refuse, of course, what has not been re-
vealed or made available to him.
Id (emphasis added).
90. See, for example, Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v WCAB, 32 Pa Commw 147, 377 A2d
1304 (1977).
91. Weber, 55 Pa Bar Ass'n Q at 157 (cited in note 84).
92. The court continued to claim, however, that the employer need not show an "ac-
tual job offer," but this is essentially the case unless the claimant ignores job referrals or
commits outright sabotage in the course of job placement efforts.
93. Dave v WCAB (Raybestos Manhattan, Inc.), 97 Pa Commw 265, 508 A2d 1335,
1337 (1986); W & L Sales Co. v WCAB (Drake), 92 Pa Commw 396, 499 A2d 710, 711
(1985), aff'd per curiam, 524 Pa 591, 574 A2d 603 (1986); Woytach v WCAB (City of Scran-
ton), 92 Pa Commw 300, 498 A2d 1390, 1391 (1985).
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open job to the injured worker.
IV. KACHINSKI AND THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF JOB AVAILABILITY
A. The Supreme Court's New Declaration and the "Concrete
Guidelines"
As discussed above, in the years after Petrone and Barrett the
commonwealfh court constructed a law of job availability that
added great substance to the essentially procedural teaching of
those cases. While the decisions during this period were subject to
some contradiction and confusion, the court-under the distinct
influence of Judge Barbieri-began to lay down a coherent body of
law to control the showing of job availability. The cases of King
Fifth Wheel and Backowski are the best public illustrations of this
influence. 4
Among the cases generated by the court reflecting this influence
was Kachinski v WCAB (Vepco Constr. Co.).9 5 In that case, an em-
ployer had filed a modification petition after securing medical evi-
dence that the claimant's disability had been resolved and that he
could work on a sedentary level. A vocational expert then located
jobs within that category, and the existence of some was communi-
cated to the claimant. The claimant did not pursue any of these
proposed jobs and the referee thus modified the claimant's
benefits. 6
The commonwealth court reversed, recounting first the new rule
that "the work proposed for a partially disabled claimant must be
actually available, that is, in fact within his reach, and it must be
brought to his notice by the employer. ' 97 In addition, however, the
court faulted the employer's proofs on the grounds that the voca-
tional testimony did not sufficiently demonstrate that the particu-
lar rigors of each proposed job were matched with the claimant's
individualized needs:
The employer does not have to produce a job offer, .... but positions
which are pie-in-the-sky, often described by vocational experts as sedentary
or light or requiring little lifting, do not without additional description of
their physical demands, establish actual availability of work which a claim-
ant with particular physical limitations can do.
94. See notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
95. 91 Pa Commw 543, 498 A2d 36 (1985), aft'd, 516 Pa 240, 532 A2d 374 (1987).




The employer's evidence [in this case] would support a finding that there
were positions of employment in the workplace for partially disabled per-
sons. It does not support the referee's findings that some of these jobs were
actually available or within reach of this claimant.98
This same reasoning was employed in a companion case, Farkaly v
WCAB (Baltimore Life Ins. Co.),99 only a day later. In that case,
the court held again that an employer's showing of job availability
was defective because the vocational counselor had failed to suffi-
ciently demonstrate that the proposed work met with the specific
medical restrictions on the claimant. While the proposed work was
identified as sedentary and the claimant was capable of doing sed-
entary work, there was no particularized evidence that the job
would not involve lifting above the level of the shoulders or push-
ing and pulling of heavy weights, which were also aspects of the
claimant's sedentary restrictions. 100
Both of these cases were accepted by the supreme court for re-
view, with Kachinski being utilized as the vehicle for announce-
ment of the new "concrete guidelines" to define the elements of
showing job availability. The contention surrounding this area of
the compensation law had been illustrated for the supreme court
by the dissenting opinions of Judge Doyle in both Kachinski and
Farkaly.
The court ultimately ratified, with some modification, the rules
generated by Judge Barbieri and the commonwealth court, but rec-
ognized and implemented the substance of those dissents. The
court first recognized that job availability for nearly half a century
had been shown in the same manner as it is in the social security
context, i.e., by merely showing the theoretical availability of
work.'01 In its view, accordingly, an issue before the high court was
"whether an employer can sustain his burden of showing available
work by demonstrating the existence of jobs in the marketplace, as
opposed to demonstrating jobs which have actually been made
available to the claimant."'1 2 This issue, the court correctly noted,
had not been considered in Petrone and Barrett.'0 3
After an analysis of the distinctions between social security and
98. Id at 39-40, citing 4156 Bar Corp., 438 A2d 657 (1981).
99. 91 Pa Commw 571, 498 A2d 34 (1985), rev'd, 516 Pa 256, 532 A2d 382 (1987).
100. Farkaly, 498 A2d at 36.
101. Kachinski, 532 A2d at 376 (recognizing that in Petrone the supreme court "un-
fortunately ... did not explain what evidence was required to show availability, but alluded
to the proof method utilized under the Social Security disability program").
102. Id.
103. Id at 376, 377-78.
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workmen's compensation, the court adopted the concept of "ac-
tual" job availability which had been generated by the common-
wealth court. In the Kachinski court's view, making this a require-
ment of the employer was not only consistent with its own prior
declarations as to "disability" in Unora, Petrone, and Barrett, but
was in consonance with the policies supporting the workmen's
compensation system:
The employer, as the owner of the production process ... bears a responsi-
bility to those who are injured while operating it. That responsibility,
though not without its limits, requires at a minimum some effort on the
part of the employer to make the injured employee whole. To impose on the
injured party the duty to find alternative work under pain of foregoing the
compensation to which he has become entitled is to condition one's receipt
of compensation on something other than the injury itself: a concept far
removed from the salutary purpose of workmen's compensation to provide
relief due to injuries caused by the workplace
Therefore, we adopt the Commonwealth Court's interpretation of "availa-
ble" as requiring a showing of actual availability.104
One injured at work, stranded into partial disability, deserves more than a
generic list describing where he might find some suitable work.105
The supreme court also adopted the requirement that the availa-
ble job be within the claimant's vocational and physical restric-
tions, but found inappropriately "hypertechnical"' 06 the common-
wealth court's demand that available jobs be meticulously matched
with the idiosyncracies of the claimant's physical restrictions.
Adopting the spirit of Judge Doyle's dissent, the court complained
that the commonwealth court's approach
basically imposed on the employer the duty to specify every aspect of every
job in question: a cumbersome burden in light of the fact that only so much
can be known about a job in advance. It is enough that the employer pro-
duce medical evidence describing the claimant's capabilities, and vocational
evidence classifying the job, e.g., whether it is light work, sedentary work,
etc., along with a basic description of the job in question. From such evi-
dence it will be up to the referee to determine whether the claimant can
perform the job in question. 10 7
The court then set forth the following as "concrete guidelines"108
104. Id at 379.
105. Id at 380.





which "consider both the employees' interest in receiving the com-
pensation due him, and the employer's interest in not being held
responsible in excess of the injury caused": 1 9
1. The employer who seeks to modify a claimant's'benefits on the basis that
-he has recovered some or all of his ability must first produce medical evi-
dence of a change in condition.
2. The employer must then produce evidence of a referral (or referrals) to a
then open job (or jobs), which fits in the occupational category for which
the claimant has been given medical, clearance, e.g., light work, sedentary
work, etc.
3. The claimant must then demonstrate that he has in good faith followed
through on the job referral(s).
4. If the referral fails to result in a job then claimant's benefits should
continue.'10
The court further elaborated substantially on these require-
ments, noting as a preface that the "viability of this system de-
pends on the good faith of the participants.""'
The court then declared, in this regard, that (1) "the referrals by
the employer must be tailored to the claimant's [vocational] abili-
ties," (2) the referrals must be "made in a good faith attempt to
return the injured employee to productive employment, rather
than a mere attempt to avoid paying compensation," (3) employees
are to "make a good faith effort to return to the work force when
they are able, and their benefits can be modified for failure to fol-
low up on referrals or for willfully sabotaging referrals," (4) in the
event that an employee "refuses a valid job offer his benefits can
be modified if it is found he had no basis upon which to do so," (5)
evidence from a physician "which rebuts the employer's evidence
of a change in condition, or indicates the unacceptability of the
offered employment, can be a basis for determination that claim-
ant has a valid reason for refusing a job offer."' 2
Applying these criteria to the facts of the appeal, the court con-
cluded that the employer had not met its burden of proof in light
of the fact that effective notice of the available jobs had not been
accomplished by the employer. The case was thus affirmed.1" In
the companion case of Farkaly, however, effective notice had been
provided. The court then held that the employer had adduced ef-
fective proof that the claimant could do sedentary work and that
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id at 380.
112. Id.
113. Id at 380-81.
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such work had been referred. The commonwealth court's denial of
modification was thus reversed on the reasoning that the court had
applied its "hypertechnical" analysis.114
B. The Cultural Revolution: Major Elaborations by the Com-
monwealth Court
A cursory review of the categorical requirements set forth by the
supreme court in Kachinski will reveal the great influence of the
commonwealth court cases generated in the years that followed Pe-
trone and Barrett. Indeed, while the supreme court settled some
disputes as to the details and issued a coherent, well thought-out
opinion, the law of the supreme court in Kachinski is still essen-
tially that of Judge Barbieri.
What the supreme court did that was of great value was to pro-
vide a policy basis for demanding that employers actually commu-
nicate the existence of suitable work to residually impaired work-
ers. (That policy, of course, is the goal of returning a worker to
productive employment in acknowledgment that this is an element
of the employer's responsibility of making an injured employee
whole.) The commonwealth court, an intermediate appellate court,
apparently felt limited in terms of making a broad policy state-
ment to generate new legal doctrine and had been mute on the
issue of why actual job availability should be the rule. Instead, this
requirement was grafted onto the law by rather tenuous use of
precedent.115
With the policy in place, however, the commonwealth court in
the next few months launched a vigorous effort, again led by Judge
Barbieri, to enforce and promote the policy. This effort was re-
flected by the filing of many opinions which declared pre-Kachin-
ski job availability efforts ineffective, resulting in the reversal of
many grants of modification.11 6 This period was to a great extent a
"veil of tears" for employers and insurance carriers to live through,
as the retroactive imposition of the "concrete guidelines" of
Kachinski undermined many pre-Kachinski modification efforts
recently completed, awaiting decision, or in the process of appeal.
The imposition of unforseen and unpredictable liability during this
114. Farkaly, 532 A2d at 383-84.
115. See notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
116. The Kachinski requirements were retroactively applied to all cases in the system
because they were considered interpretations of then-existing law. See M&D Auto Body v
WCAB (Pallot), Pa Commw , 599 A2d 1016, 1020 n 5 (1991).
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period most likely ran into the millions of dollars.
The more remarkable aspect of the effort, however, was the vir-
tual "cultural revolution" which the court undertook to make ma-
jor elaborations on the "concrete guidelines" of Kachinski. These
new elaborations once and for all put to rest all notions that job
availability was to be decided on a theoretical basis or in a vac-
uum, and instituted a job availability doctrine that approaches the
level of constituting a basic vocational rehabilitation program of
job placement.
These changes were undertaken in three cases decided by Judge
Barbieri within the immediate six months after Kachinski. These
cases effected the conversion by way of an ingenious series of inter-
pretations of the employer's good faith burden in making job refer-
rals. The court seized upon this concept, articulated in Kachinski,
to create various new or more detailed employer requirements in
the job availability/job placement effort.
While these "major elaborations" on Kachinski announced in
these early months are undoubtedly part of the present law, they
were nevertheless greeted with some distress by employers at the
time. After all, the supreme court had announced "concrete guide-
lines" in a detailed, technical opinion, and the immediate emer-
gence of further requirements was a surprise to most contemporary
commentators, certainly including this writer.117 And, of course,
the immediate evolution of new detailed requirements confounded
the legal community-indeed, the commonwealth court had been
scolded in Kachinski for being too "hypertechnical" in its require-
ments concerning the demonstration of job availability.
1. Doing "Everything Possible" to Convey Job Referrals to the
Claimant-Communication of Basic Data
One of the least expected decisions to follow Kachinski was
Todloski v WCAB (Supermarket Serv. Corp.). 8 In this case the
practice of some vocational counselors to dominate the job place-
ment or search process was roundly condemned, with the court in-
sisting that the employer or vocational counselor provide full infor-
mation to the worker as to the identity, name, and address of the
potential employer.
The vocational counselor in Todloski was apparently required to
117. See, for example, David B. Torrey, Kachinski and Showing Job Availability: A
Fourteen Month Retrospective, Pa Workmen's Compensation Newsletter at 3 (Jan 1989).
118. 115 Pa Commw 138, 539 A2d 517 (1988).
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work through the injured worker's attorney. She would locate an
appropriate job and then send a descriptive letter to the attorney.
She would not include the name and address of the potential em-
ployer, instead requesting that the claimant call her if he was in-
terested in the opportunity.11 9
As suggested above, this method of communicating the availabil-
ity of work was outlawed by Judge Barbieri. The court flatly stated
that "a job opening is simply not available to the claimant unless
he is informed of the name and address of the job. Here the Em-
ployer did not do everything possible to convey this information
... .It is the Employer's burden to effectively convey this infor-
mation."'120 The court in this regard apparently sensed that the vo-
cational counselor was "playing games" with the job referral pro-
cess, and implied in rather harsh language that the whole process
lacked good faith on the employer's part:
Here the employer did not do everything possible to convey this informa-
tion to Claimant. . . , but instead chose to deliberately withhold vital infor-
mation in order to control the application process....
It is employer's burden to give the claimant all the necessary information
to apply for a job opening, not to take the claimant by the hand or control
the claimant's job search.
121
The existence of this rule has led, in any event, to the
mandatory employer practice of providing essential information as
to the nature of the job referral, and the avoidance of dominating
the job placement effort. The case has not been read to forbid
close monitoring of the process by rehabilitation counselors, nor is
it illegitimate for counselors to accompany claimants to interviews,
though this practice is probably of questionable utility in the vast
majority of cases.
2. Insuring That the Potential Employer is Cognizant That
the Potential Employee Has Restrictions
A second case filed within this immediate period admonished
that job availability will only be shown when there is some likeli-
hood that the potential employer will realistically consider employ-
ing the worker with his or her physical limitations. This case,
Young v WCAB (Weis Markets),'122 possesses memorable facts
119. Todloski, 539 A2d at 518.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 113 Pa Commw 533, 537 A2d 393 (1988).
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which led to the rule.
The claimant had been off work for several years, had undergone
multiple surgeries, and had become a methadone addict. The em-
ployer's physician, nonetheless, cleared him for sedentary work.
The vocational counselor, in the course of the ensuing job search,
did not inform the prospective employer that claimant was a meth-
adone addict; that he had "undergone at least seven back opera-
tions in three years"; 123 that he had not worked in six years; the
nature of the claimant's previous injuries; and that the claimant
was forty-six years of age. The counselor apparently did not make
a firm determination of whether the potential employer involved in
the referral would accept an application from the worker.
24
The failure to convey this information and determine whether
an application would be accepted was, in the court's view, fatal to
the employer's attempt to demonstrate job availability. The court's
concern in this case, among others, was that withholding of the
information reflected lack of good faith. As if finding a fact, the
court declared that the omissions committed by the vocational
counselor reflected "simply an attempt to avoid paying compensa-
tion rather than a good faith attempt to return the employee to
productive employment.'
1 25
In addition, Judge Barbieri drew upon his pre-Kachinski case of
King Fifth Wheel v WCAB (Rhodes),126 for support in the declara-
tion that failure to reveal the omitted information rendered the
potential job actually unavailable:
This court has held that a job is not actually available unless there is
evidence that the employer named was willing to accept the claimant as an
employee with his current physical limitations .... As Employer's voca-
tional counselor chose not to discuss Claimant's physical limitations with
the prospective employers, the jobs were not available .... If the employer
is unwilling to even take an application from a claimant in response to the
vocational expert's inquiries, the claimant has received nothing more than
an opportunity to walk off the street an apply for a want ad job in the same
manner as any member of the general public. This is not a job referral.
"One injured at work, stranded into partial disability, deserves more than a
generic list describing where he might find some suitable work.'2
The lesson of this case is difficult to cast firmly; an analysis of
what to inform the potential employer of in each case will have to
123. Young, 537 A2d at 396.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 79 Pa Commw 300, 468 A2d 1211 (1983).
127. Young, 537 A2d at 396.
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be a matter of judgment. The entire rule, of course, is problematic,
as conveying the information invites the potential employer to pos-
sibly discriminate on the basis of disability or age. Normally, of
course, for an employer to affirmatively inquire into these things
would be illegal." '
It is submitted, however, that under the present regime a rule of
thumb is that the vocational counselor should inform the prospec-
tive employer of any aspect of the claimant's disability which a
reasonable employer would want to know in making a decision
with regard to whether an application from the employee could se-
riously be considered, based upon the essential job tasks of the po-
tential work.
3. Informing the Claimant of the Physical Aspects of the Job,
Occupational Category, and the Fact That the Claimant Has
Been Cleared for Some Level of Work
In the third of the three "cultural revolution" cases, Four-Way
Constr. Co. v WCAB (Snyder),'29 the commonwealth court in one
fell swoop added three more elements to the job availability re-
quirements. In this case, Judge Barbieri demanded that the job re-
ferral letter or other communication to the claimant (or his or her
counsel) include notice of (1) the particular physical demands of
the potential job, (2) the fact that such demands are within the
physical restrictions established for the claimant, and (3) the occu-
pational category within which the job falls. Only in this way, ac-
cording to the court, will the employer show that it made "an ef-
fort to convey necessary information which it ha[s] in its
possession to claimant . .. . I
The court was cautious of the supreme court's admonition that
every aspect of the proposed work need not be compiled and then
revealed:
We do not mean to say that Employer must specifically detail every aspect
of the job before Claimant has the responsibility to follow it up.. . . But
Employer must at least provide the Claimant or his counsel with a general
job classification along with a basic description to give Claimant something
to go on,"'1
128. See, for example, The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC § 12101 et seq
(1991).
129. 113 Pa Commw 235, 536 A2d 873 (1988).




The court's requirement that the claimant be advised of the fact
of the clearance for some level of work is rather subtle; neverthe-
less, this has come to be recognized as an essential requirement.
One pre-Kachinski practice was not to share this information, but
to simply approach the claimant "out of nowhere" with job refer-
rals. This often resulted in the claimant failing to follow through
on job referrals, later to complain that he or she knew nothing of
being released. Such omissions led to the failure of demonstrating
job availability in innumerable post-Kachinski cases.132
It is submitted that an essential requirement for vocational
counselors and employers in the job availability/job placement ef-
fort is informing the worker at the outset of vocational rehabilita-
tion of the fact of the release to sedentary, light work or other oc-
cupational category. In fact, a good practice is to forward
immediately the restrictions form or report from a physician to the
claimant; there is usually no good reason to keep such information
a secret. Further, if a treating physician is being uncommunicative
with his patient-an all too common allegation from injured work-
ers-the counselor should intervene and tell the claimant that his
own physician has released him for work.
C. Post-Revolution Refinements: Continuing Elaborations by the
Commonwealth Court
For the first six months after Kachinski, the commonwealth
court enacted major elaborations on the concrete guidelines pro-
vided by the supreme court. Since that time, those major elabora-
tions have been ratified by further court panels, and the three
principal cases have become entrenched in the law. As discussed
below, however, further refinements have also been made to the
law of job availability over the past five years.
1. Sufficiency of Proof Regarding Medical Appropriateness of
Proposed Work: Procedure
A basic requirement of the supreme court was, of course, that
before any job referrals be made, the employer secure medical evi-
dence of a change in recovery which would permit the claimant to
perform some level of modified work. A reading of the "concrete
guidelines" indicates that the employer is to secure such medical
132. See, for example, York Terrace/Beverly Enterprises v WCAB (Lucas), 140 Pa
Commw 75, 591 A2d 762 (1991).
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information and then refer jobs to the worker falling within the
occupational category reflected in such information.
Controversy, however, immediately erupted in the course of
hearings with regard to this requirement. The Four-Way Con-
struction case had, in this regard, demanded immediately after
Kachinski that the employer inform the claimant before the job
referral process or at the time of referrals of the medical clearance
for work. The controversy which arose dealt with a twist on this
issue, i.e., whether the employer or vocational counselor was re-
quired to secure specific physician approval of each particular
job, and inform the claimant of the approval at the time of the job
referral. The controversy was real, as many referees viewed specific
job approval as mandatory under Kachinski and would announce
at the outset of litigated cases that the vocational rehabilitation
attempts were defunct.'33
The commonwealth court has addressed this issue in five cases
with some arguable contradiction present. Judge Barbieri has au-
thored an opinion implying that specific job approval is required
prior to job referrals,13 but since that time the commonwealth
court has flatly held in four other cases that specific job approvals
are not required. The first case to so hold was Associated Plumb-
ing and Heating v WCAB (Hartzog),35 and the issue was again
addressed in Lukens, Inc. v WCAB (Williams):'36
It is not necessary to obtain medical clearance for each job referral ....
[To the contrary,] Employer must prove that Claimant was apprised of
medical approval for a category of positions.
In a recent workmen's compensation opinion, we noted that the addi-
tional step of submitting each job description to the physician was unneces-
sary when he had previously established restrictions for the claimant.137
It is submitted that the foregoing case, in which the court di-
rectly addressed the issue, articulates the current law. 38 The rule
133. See, for example, Torrey, Pa Workmen's Compensation Newsletter at 13 (cited in
note 117).
134. Holmes House & PMA Ins. Co. v WCAB (Shanahan), 127 Pa Commw 199, 561
A2d 349 (1989).
135. 126 Pa Commw 618, 560 A2d 865 (1989).
136. 130 Pa Commw 479, 568 A2d 981 (1989).
137. Lukens, Inc., 568 A2d at 984.
138. See also School Dist. of Phila. v WCAB (Stutts), Pa Commw ,603 A2d 682,
686 (1992) ("this court has never held that a physician must review and approve each posi-
tion prior to referral to a claimant"); Jayne v WCAB (King Fifth Wheel), 137 Pa Commw
211, 585 A2d 604 (1991) (employer met burden of providing proper referral without first
securing specific job approval). See also Sule v WCAB (Kraft, Inc.), 121 Pa Commw 242,
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is appropriate, in addition, because Kachinski made no mention of
specific job approvals. Finally, as a practical matter, requiring such
specific approvals before job referrals are made is to impose a
nearly impossible burden. As one commentator stated at the time:
As a practical matter, if every job procured has to be sent first to both
claimant's and employer's physicians for approval before it is referred to
claimant, the job will almost never still be "open" by the time physicians
have received and responded to the vocational counselor's
correspondence."'
Of course, this point is absolutely correct. In an era where physi-
cians already complain of being overloaded with paperwork, and
are often hostile to the litigation-laden workmen's compensation
system, it is especially unrealistic that physicians will rush to ana-
lyze and then return specific job approvals in the course of his pa-
tient's vocational rehabilitation effort.
2. Sufficiency of Proof Regarding Medical Appropriateness of
Proposed Work: Medical Evidence
A keystone of the Kachinski guidelines is the securing of medi-
cal clearance for the worker. As discussed above, this must be the
first step in any vocational rehabilitation effort. Further, while it
may be valuable to secure specific job approvals from physicians, it
is not a requirement to do so and/or communicate them to the
claimant before or at the time of the job referral.
The commonwealth court has addressed the substantive aspect
of medical clearance in a number of cases. In a common-sense
opinion, the court in Lukens Inc. v WCAB (Williams)14 0 clarified,
for example, that the medical evidence need not show an actual
"change" in the claimant's condition, as implied from the guide-
lines in Kachinski. Instead, it is sufficient that the medical testi-
mony simply establish the current capacity of the claimant to do a
certain level of work. " " In other words, the dynamic quality of an
actual "change" or recent recovery does not necessarily have to be
shown.
550 A2d 847 (1988).
139. John C. Jackson, Rehabilitating Employees in Post-Kachinski Times, 13 Pa L J
at 4, No 28 (July 16, 1990).
140. 130 Pa Commw 479, 568 A2d 981 (1989).
141. Lukens, Inc., 568 A2d at 983 ("it is not a prerequisite to produce medical evi-
dence of a change in condition when the Petition for Modification involves a claimant with




As in any other case where medical testimony is required, the
physician must be unequivocal in his opinion that the worker can
do the work proposed. This rule, which is not surprising, is also an
important one, as one defense of a claimant for not responding to
job referrals, or rejecting actual offers, is that he cannot perform
the work. If this is the claimant's defense in a litigated case, one of
his attorney's tasks will surely be to attempt to shake the opinion
of the employer's physician that the claimant can work.
This was the scenario which unfolded in Pettigrew v WCAB
(Yarway Co.). 4' In that case, the employer's physician cleared the
claimant for sedentary work, but on cross-examination was re-
vealed as being uncertain in his opinion that claimant could do
work. The physician was closely pressed by counsel with regard to
whether claimant, who had disregarded the job referrals, could do
work while taking the various narcotics he admittedly was on. The
physician responded that she remained of the opinion that the
claimant could do sedentary work, "with the proviso that he be
able to come off the medication.' 143 Ultimately the physician is-
sued a fatal equivocation, declining to render any opinion at all as
to whether claimant could work while on medication at the partic-
ular time of the job referrals.4 In the commonwealth court's view,
the physician was simply not certain in her opinion. The grant of
modification was thus reversed. This was plainly an appropriate
result.
In an unsatisfactory opinion, the court has also implied that a
physician's acknowledgement that a claimant would experience
pain upon the return to work has not really been shown to be ca-
pable of working within a particular occupational category. In this
case, Chavis v WCAB (Port Authority of Allegheny Cty.),'4" a ref-
eree had modified the claimant's benefits after she returned to
work. On appeal, the court examined the medical testimony which
purported to establish the claimant's ability to do light work. In its
view, the admissions by claimant's physician that after the claim-
ant would do work on a "day-in, day-out basis, I imagine the pain
would just get worse and worse and he would probably not be able
to keep doing it,' 46 indicated that work was not really available to
the claimant:
142. 139 Pa Commw 488, 590 A2d 1364 (1991).
143. Pettigrew, 590 A2d at 1367.
144. Id.
145. 142 Pa Commw 445, 598 A2d 97 (1991).
146. Chavis, 598 A2d at 99.
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Pain is an excellent symptom of an injury... and pain from a work-related
injury may be compensable where there is substantial evidence of its
existence....
While the six positions referred to claimant by the vocational expert may
have been available to him, the evidence demonstrates that Claimant could
not perform the duties of those positions for any appreciable duration or
without incurring chronic pain. Consequently, Claimant's disability contin-
ued, as the evidence fails to support the referee's findings that Claimant
could perform the duties required of those job positions made available to
Claimant.
147
Because the relied-upon medical testimony was thus insufficient,
the grant of modification was reversed.
An analysis of the. medical testimony in this case shows that
both employer's and claimant's physicians had placed serious limi-
tations on the claimant's ability to work. Perhaps the better reso-
lution of the case would have simply been to declare that both
physicians were equivocal in their opinions that the claimant could
work; to declare, or at least imply, that because the claimant would
have to work with pain a job is not available constitutes a signifi-
cant departure from both Kachinski and normal concepts of disa-
bility law in general.
Of course, the notion that a claimant who would have to work
with some degree of pain or chronic pain is forever totally disabled
is unacceptable. There has, after all, always been a distinction
drawn between pain and disabling pain.14 Many workers, indeed,
have pain yet can and do work. Individuals such as Franklin
Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy come to mind as workers who suf-
fered from chronic pain but led productive, vigorous lives and
thrived and prospered. To allow a worker to remain on total disa-
bility because of complaints of chronic pain-as opposed to verifia-
ble disabling pain-is unacceptable from a societal point of view.
The distinction between chronic pain and chronic disabling pain
should remain as a dichotomy taken for granted in workmen's
compensation. 14 9
147. Id at 100-01.
148. See, for example, George R. Zaiser, Proving Disabling Pain in Social Security
Proceedings: The Social Security Administration and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
22 Duquesne L Rev 491 (1984).
149. The Chavis case can probably be read as consistent with this proposition. While
the court did not recognize the difference between chronic pain and chronic disabling pain,




3. Sufficiency of Proof Regarding Medical Appropriateness of
Proposed Work: Post-Injury Non-Work-Related Conditions
One of the most surprising new elaborations of Kachinski is the
rule announced in Sheehan v WCAB (Supermarkets Gen. and
ALEXSIS, Inc.).150 The Sheehan case addresses a fairly common
question with respect to which there was no definite answer previ-
ously. What kind of job must the employer provide to a worker
who has recovered sufficiently from his work injury to return to
some level of work, but continues to be precluded because of a sub-
sequent, non-work-related condition?
In the Sheehan case, the court held that the employer's burden
is only to show a job within the claimant's medically established
work-related restrictions-restrictions stemming from a subse-
quent malady need not be accommodated. This surprising result
will be clearly illustrated from the facts of the case. The claimant
had suffered a back injury while at work, which was acknowledged
as compensable. This occurred on May 8, 1985. While recovering
from that injury, he suffered, on July 4, 1985, a non-work-related
heart attack.
Later, in November, 1985, the employer filed a suspension peti-
tion. The claimant, in this regard, had been offered his old job
back, as modified by lifting limitations. He did not return, because
he had not been cleared for a return to such work by his
cardiologist.
The employer, had not given any consideration, "when making
the referral, to any restrictions on Claimant's ability to perform,
the modified work as a result of his heart attack.' 151 The referee
suspended the claimant's benefits, even though it was true that he
had not been cleared for a return to work by his cardiologist. The
Board affirmed.
The claimant, in the commonwealth court, contended that the
employer had not made a job within his physical limitations "actu-
ally available" to him. This is, of course, a requirement under
Kachinski. The claimant argued, specifically, that the referee and
the Board committed error "by failing to consider the medical lim-
itations caused by his subsequent non-work-related heart attack
when he was medically cleared for the job."'
1 5 2
The commonwealth court rejected this assertion, holding that
150. Pa Commw , 600 A2d 633 (1991).
151. Sheehan, 600 A2d at 635.
152. Id at 636.
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the employer had met its burden by offering a job within the
claimant's work-related restrictions:
Physical limitations taken into consideration to determine job availability
cannot be construed to include those physical limitations resulting from a
non-work-related injury with no causal connection to the prior work-related
injury nor which are related to physical limitations existing prior to the
injury.2
53
The court reasoned that:
To construe it otherwise would require the employer to compensate an em-
ployee for injuries occurring away from the job during the period that the
employee is recovering from his or her work-related injury. The intent of




A referee need not take into consideration an injury suffered by a claim-
ant which did not occur during the course of his or her employment nor
was causally connected to the prior work-related injury when determining
job availability.155
The court has recently applied the rule again in Tunnelton Min-
ing Co./Pa. Mines Corp. v WCAB (Adams),56 reversing the refe-
ree's refusal to grant modification. The reasoning was the same:
"The purpose of workmen's compensation is to provide benefits to
11157employees who suffer work-related injuries ....
It is submitted that these new cases were correctly decided. The
holding itself, however, is perhaps surprising, as the notion of "ac-
tual job availability" established in Kachinski implies that one
must always take into account the injured worker's "total body dis-
ability," or complete character, in considering his or her suitability
for a particular job. After all, Unora spoke of whole-person consid-
erations-"anatomical factors . . . , mental, outlook, his industrial
background, his education . ... 15s
The potential applications of the new case are considerable. As
an example only is the often-encountered problem of the case of
the young woman who suffers an injury and who, while recovering,
153. Id at 637.
154. Id.
155. Id (emphasis added).
156. Pa Commw ,601 A2d 483 (1991) (claimant's tremulousness, caused by circu-
lation problem or other undiagnosed systemic ailment, prevented claimant from doing light
work, but this was not work-related and need not be taken into consideration).
157. Tunnelton Mining Co./Pa., 601 A2d at 485.
158. See note 48 and accompanying text.
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becomes pregnant. It is not unusual for a pregnant claimant to re-
fuse to return to work, even though cleared vis-a-vis the injury, on
the grounds that she is in the course of her pregnancy and should
not or cannot work.
Plainly, under the Sheehan case, this ground for refusing to re-
turn to work within the work-related restrictions is not valid. A
referee should look at the claimant's recovery, the work-related re-
strictions, and consider whether the job referred falls within those
restrictions. The impairment due to pregnancy is irrelevant under
the new precedent.
The reasoning of the case should perhaps also be advanced by
defense counsel into the vocational arena. For example, if during
the worker's recovery he is convicted for post-injury distribution of
cocaine, it is likely that a job for the worker will be hard to find. If
potential employers decline to hire the worker because of his his-
tory of arrest, out-on-bail status, or felony conviction, but are will-
ing to say that an offer would have been extended had the claim-
ant not so sinned, the employer could well argue that it is post-
injury vocational conditions that continue to disable the worker.
Modification or suspension should then follow.
Certainly another theory to test, using this new case as support,
is whether an employer is required to show a job within the post-
injury restrictions which exist because of pre-injury conditions. For
example, given the reasoning of this new case, it seems questiona-
ble -whether an employer should have to find a job for a worker
whose non-work-related, pre-injury condition has worsened to dis-
abling levels during the period of work-injury recovery.
Such a situation would exist in the case of an older industrial
worker who, at the time of the work injury-for example, a seri-
ously deranged knee-has insidious but non-disabling arthritis of
the spine. A time may come when the claimant can return to light
work from the standpoint of the knee, but cannot work at all be-
cause of the insidious and worsening nature of the spinal arthritis.
Can the employer offer the claimant a light-work job and get an
order of suspension when the hapless claimant necessarily declines
to return to work? This scenario and other variations remain unde-
cided. In this writer's view, the utility of the Sheehan case beyond
its actual or similar facts may be limited. This is so because the
Kachinski doctrine is premised on actual job availability. This
doctrine has traditionally suggested that the worker's total body
disability must be accommodated. While it is reasonable and just
not to burden the employer with a claimant's restrictions stem-
556 Vol. 30:515
Partial Disability
ming from obvious post-injury maladies, precisely how far the
court will take the underlying reasoning is unclear.
4. "Effective Communication" of Open Jobs
The basic Kachinski requirement that the availability of jobs be
communicated effectively to workers has been treated repeatedly
in the commonwealth court. The precedents in this regard are
fairly consistent, but in one respect, as will be seen, there is some
confusion.
There is no confusion, however, with regard to the essential re-
quirement that the fact of the release, the nature of the job, and a
basic description of the job be communicated to the worker. For
example, in York Terrace/Beverly Enterprises v WCAB (Lu-
cas), ' 5 the claimant had been certified by a physician as able to do
sedentary work. The employer's personnel administrator, having
learned of this, then determined that there was such a job availa-
ble to the claimant at the employer's facility. The claimant then
received a letter from the employer's counsel offering the job. The
letter from the lawyer also stated that the claimant had been
"medically cleared"'160 for the particular position being offered, but
apparently contained no elaboration. The letter omitted any men-
tion of the doctor involved or what occupational category had been
approved for her.'
6 '
The claimant, allegedly because of this omission, did not return
to work; "she did not follow up on the referral, because she did not
think she was physically capable of returning to work.' 62 Although
the referee thereafter found that the claimant could have per-
formed the work, both the Board and the commonwealth court
reversed.
Applying Kachinski, the court insisted that a claimant is not
obliged to follow through on a job referral until he or she knows of
the medical clearance for such a return. The brief inclusion of the
lawyer's letter, recounted above, was insufficient.'
6 3
A similar defective communication resulted in a tragic reversal
of a modification order in Sheehan v WCAB (Supermarkets Gen.
159. 140 Pa Commw 75, 591 A2d 762 (1991).
160. York Terrace/Beverly Enterprises, 591 A2d at 764.
161. Id.
162. Id at 763.
163. Id at 764. The doctor did later testify about his release of the claimant, but at
that point no re-offer of the job was made. There was, accordingly, no evidence produced by
the employer "that the job existed at the time [the doctor] gave his deposition." Id.
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and ALEXSIS).6 4 In that case, the claimant had been cleared for
work and the employer thereafter offered the claimant a modified
job. A letter sent to the claimant stated that his physician had es-
tablished restrictions for him, but failed to state which physician
and what the restrictions were.16 5 The claimant, also, was not sent
the doctor's report. The claimant ignored the job referrals, and the
referee later modified his benefits. The court, however, held that
the letter failed to effectively communicate the release and excused
the claimant from following through on the referral. 66
The law in this regard is not totally formalistic. For example, if
the claimant admits that she knows of the release, the omission of
such advice in the referral letter or other offer is not fatal to an
otherwise appropriate job referral. In Adromalos-Dale v WCAB
(U.S. Air, Inc.), e7 the claimant admitted that she knew of some of
the specific job approvals of her treating physician, es and such ad-
mission was held to satisfy the requirement of notification to the
claimant of clearance for some category of work. Similarly, if the
job being referred to the claimant is already familiar to the worker,
a recounting of the duties involved in the case is not required. In
Braun Baking v WCAB (Stevens),' 9 the employer offered the
claimant modified work but failed to provide a job description.
When the referee thereafter suspended the claimant's benefits for
refusal to return to work, the claimant appealed, complaining that
the failure to provide the job description was in violation of the
164. Pa Commw , 600 A2d 633 (1991).
165. The defective letter provided, in full:
It will be possible for you to return to work in a limited capacity. The restrictions
outlined by your physician on October 19, 1985, can be observed with very little
modification.
Your aisle assignment will be changed to meet the lifting requirement over the four
to six week reindoctrination period.
Please contact the store for a return date.
Sheehan, 600 A2d at 638.
166. Id at 635. See also generally Raleigh-Garrett v Henkels & McCoy, Inc., No A90-
579 (App Bd, filed 7-31-91). In this case, the following referral letter was found defective:
We have been notified by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company that you are available
for light duty.
Please report to James Helsel, Manager of Support Systems, on Monday October 27
at 8:00 a.m. for job assignment.
Both the referee and Board concluded, correctly, that this referral letter did not communi-
cate the fact of the job release, or job duties, as required by the cases. Neither did the letter
tell the claimant where to report.
167. Pa Commw , 599 A2d 304 (1991).
168. Adromalos-Dale, 599 A2d at 306.




The commonwealth court refused to reverse. The evidence de-
veloped by the employer showed that the claimant had already
performed the modified duty and thus knew full well what the
tasks were and that they fell within the occupational category
which had been established for him.170
The court has also held that if the requirements of a proposed
job are obvious to the person being referred the job, a recounting
of duties is not necessary. In M&D Auto Body v WCAB (Pal-
lott),17 1 the claimant had succeeded in fighting off modification by
arguing that the vocational counselor had not, in the course of re-
ferring to the claimant a job of car salesman, described the duties
involved. While this argument had impressed the referee, the com-
monwealth court reversed:
Four-Way Construction requires that an employer "must at least provide
the [c]laimant or his counsel a general job classification along with a basic
description to give [c]laimant something to go on.". . . Here, M&D's reha-
bilitation counselor told Pallott that a position selling cars was available.
The nature of a car sales position is such that it does not require much
additional information to permit a claimant to determine whether the posi-
tion may be within his medical limitations. Therefore, we hold that M&D
satisfied the notice requirement of Four-Way Construction.
17 2
This common sense rule has apparently been contradicted, how-
ever, in School Dist. of Phila. v WCAB (Stutts).173 In that case,
the claimant had been cleared for work and a vocational counselor
thereafter referred to her several sedentary jobs, mostly telephone
sales positions, "but failed to provide a basic description in its no-
tices of the job duties or to state that the jobs were within the
restrictions for which Claimant had been given medical clear-
ance."' 74 The referee and Board had denied the employer's modifi-
cation petition based on this and other deficiencies.
On appeal, the employer argued that the jobs were obviously
sedentary and-invoking the spirit of the original Kachinski prece-
dent-that the referee had been "hypertechnical" in the applica-
tion of the Kachinski requirements. This argument provoked an
irritated response:
Although the jobs involved here may appear to be "obviously sedentary,"
170. Braun Baking, 583 A2d at 863.
171. Pa Commw , 599 A2d 1016 (1991).
172. M&D Auto Body, 599 A2d at 1020.
173. Pa Commw , 603 A2d 682 (1992).
174. School Dist. of Phila., 603 A2d at 682.
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we think that claimants must not be forced to rely on their own specula-
tions and suppositions in regard to such a crucial matter ...
The burdens imposed on employers in regard to job referrals are not on-
erous. Kachinski itself rejected a requirement that an employer "specify
every aspect of every job in question" in favor of a requirement of a "basic
job description of the job in question . . . ." Further, this court has never
held that a physician must review and approve each position prior to refer-
ral to a claimant. . . . However, where an employer fails to provide essen-
tial information in line with the requirements for proper notice, the claim-
ant should not suffer suspension.
17 5
There seems to be no basis for distinguishing these two recent
cases. Which case should control is a difficult call. Both articulate
reasonable rules. M&D Auto Body sets forth a rule which is sup-
ported by common sense and prevents game-playing by claimants
who wish to avoid following through on appropriate job referrals
with the formalistic excuse that they did not have an idea of what
duties are involved. On the other hand, the declarations of School
Dist. of Phila. are faithful to Kachinski and are not unreasonable.
It is submitted that the best rule is that of the School Dist. of
Phila. case, with the exception that if it is shown that the claimant
had a good idea of what the proposed job involved (as revealed, for
example, on cross-examination), and would not have to "speculate
or suppose" in this regard, the employer has nevertheless met the
burden of effectively communicating a job offer notwithstanding
the omission of recounting the job duties. Of course, the contro-
versy can be avoided altogether by employers making job referrals
which provide job descriptions. This is not, indeed, an "onerous
burden."
It is important, of course, that the job described in a referral
letter accurately portray the actual job. A claimant who has
worked the same modified job at an earlier point, and can contra-
dict the job description from personal knowledge, may be able to
ignore a job referral totally and with his or her testimony on this
point defeat a resultant modification or suspension petition. Like-
wise, if the employer's own witness as to the rigors of the job de-
scribes it as involving tasks more rigorous than described in the
referral letter, the premise of the petition could easily be
destroyed.
176
The commonwealth court has held that among the things the
175. Id at 685, 686 (citations omitted).




employer need not communicate is the fact of the legal conse-
quences which may follow if the claimant fails to follow through on
a referral. In Adromalos-Dale, a flight attendant had suffered a
back injury and was off work. After her physician released her to
do modified work, a rehabilitation counselor sent her job referrals,
but the claimant utterly ignored them. She explained later that the
jobs were not what she expected and that she had no interest in
them. She also complained that the rehabilitation counselor had
not advised her of the possible consequences of ignoring the refer-
rals.17 In the end, however, the referee suspended the claimant's
benefits, finding that she did not act in good faith in not even try-
ing to pursue the jobs referred to her.
On appeal the claimant argued that benefits should not be sus-
pended when the vocational counselor or similar person fails to ad-
vise the worker of the consequences of non-cooperation. The com-
monwealth court, however, rejected this position and affirmed the
suspension of benefits:
The disclosure requirement which Claimant advocates presupposes that a
claimant will not act in good faith to follow up on job referrals unless she is
threatened with an adverse consequence for failing to do so. Kachinski
places a good faith burden on the claimant, however, and the claimant who
fails to exercise good faith to follow up on job referrals cannot be heard to
complain that she did not know adverse consequences would attach.
[Further, we agree that if the vocational counselor had to make this dis-
closure] it would put the rehabilitation counselor in the position of offering
legal advice. We agree that Claimant's position asks the rehabilitation coun-
selor to go beyond his or her expertise, and we reject that argument. 17 8
It is submitted that the foregoing case was correctly decided, as
consistent not only with Kachinski but with the general rule that
employers and insurance carriers are not duty-bound to advise
workers with regard to their rights under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act. 179 Further, the rule should also apply to claims adjust-
ers and in-house employment personnel-there is no duty on the
part of such individuals to provide advice as to how a worker is or
is not to respond to job referrals, nor the possible consequences of
177. Andromalos-Dale, 599 A2d at 305.
178. Id at 306.
179. Taglianetti v WCAB, 503 Pa 270, 469 A2d 548, 550 (1983). See also David B.
Torrey, Time Limitations in the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation and Occupa-
tional Disease Acts: Theoretical Doctrine and Current Applications, 24 Duquesne L Rev
975, 1108-09 (1986). Compare WCAB v Popatek, 18 Pa Commw 158, 334 A2d 317 (1975)
(claimant's confusion as to his rights under compensation act will not work to extend filing




All of the foregoing cases obviously take into account the basic
Kachinski principle that referred jobs be actually available-not
theoretically available. This principle was applied in the context of
what types of jobs must be communicated to an employee in
Moore v WCAB (Int'l Serv. Sys.). s° In this case the claimant had
ignored job referrals for full-time light duty work for which she
had been cleared. After the employer filed a modification petition,
the referee concluded that the claimant had, indeed, ignored the
referrals. She found, however, based upon the medical evidence
presented, that the claimant could do only part-time modified
work. Still, the referee modified the claimant's benefits. l sl
The commonwealth court reversed. It first reviewed the record
and saw no communications of part-time light work to the claim-
ant. Only full-time offers could be discerned. The referee thus
could not properly have modified the claimant's benefits:
We can only assume that the referee and Board decided that the availability
of a full-time position subsumes the availability of a part-time position. We
hold, however, that such an assumption is without either a factual or a legal
foundation. An employer's need for a full-time employee does not in any
way imply that such an employer would be willing to accept an employee
who could only work some part of the time required to fill the vacant full-
time position. 82
As the Kachinski doctrine is premised upon a showing of actual
job availability, the foregoing case was decided correctly.
5. Geographic Locations of Referred Jobs
As evidenced from the recounting of the earlier law, a long-
standing rule before the accession of the Kachinski regime was
that, for a job to be available to the worker, it had to be within the
general area of his residence.183
This rule has been affirmed under Kachinski in three cases. For
example, in Titusville Hospital v WCAB (Ward), s4 the employer
had referred the claimant several jobs, some of which were a con-
siderable distance from her home. The claimant complained that
she did not have transportation to these proposed worksites, and
the employer did not produce rebuttal evidence as to how the
180. 137 Pa Commw 582, 586 A2d 1047 (1991).
181. Moore, 586 A2d at 1048, 1049.
182. Id at 1050 (emphasis added).
183. See note 77 and accompanying text.
184. 122 Pa Commw 619, 552 A2d 365 (1988).
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claimant could transport herself to these sites. The claimant did
not apply for the distant employment and a referee ultimately re-
duced her benefits.
This decision was reversed by the Board and the commonwealth
court agreed. In its view, "Absent proof by Employer that suitable
work is available to Claimant in the area of her residence, Em-
ployer failed to show that such work is in fact within Claimant's
reach."'
A more narrowly defined rule with regard to what constitutes the
"area of. . . residence" has been articulated in Scheib v WCAB
(Ames Dept. Store).86 In this case, the claimant had suffered an
injured knee and was paid compensation. Later, job referrals were
sent to her. The claimant ignored the referrals, testifying that she
did so because (1) four of the jobs were located outside Millers-
burg, her hometown, and throughout her life she had only worked
in town, where she also lived, and (2) she did not like the prospect
of driving on the snow and ice which would likely be on the rural
roads necessary to traverse to get to the four potential jobs.17
While the referee was persuaded that the four jobs, located from
eight to thirty-seven miles from Millersburg, were outside of the
geographic area appropriate for the claimant-and were thus un-
available-the Board and the commonwealth court disagreed and
insisted that the claimant's benefits be suspended for her refusal to
follow through on the job referrals.
In this regard, the commonwealth court pointed out that the
claimant had transportation, and hence would be able to drive to
the potential jobs. This being the case, the claimant, in this partic-
ular case, had unjustifiably ignored referrals to potentially availa-
ble jobs:
As long as the position is within a geographic area where others in the same
community would accept employment, a person's personal preference as to
where he or she would like to work is irrelevant . ... 18S
The employer in the case had apparently demonstrated, through
its vocational counselor, that the distances involved in the four
jobs were distances typically undertaken by other residents of Mil-
lersburg; hence, the employer had met its burden of referring avail-
able jobs.
185. Titusville Hosp., 552 A2d at 367.
186. Pa Commw , 598 A2d 1032 (1991).
187. Scheib, 598 A2d at 1034.
188. Id (emphasis added).
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The new case sets forth an objective, rather than subjective, test
as to the type of distance a claimant should be expected to travel.
Plainly, the teaching of this case is that the vocational counselor
should undertake some sort of analysis as to whether the proposed
jobs he or she is directing to a worker is within the typical distance
traveled by other local workers. A rule of reasonableness should, of
course, still prevail, and attention must still be given to the availa-
bility of transportation to each individual claimant.
The pre-Kachinski case of Yellow Freight v WCAB 189 plainly re-
mains the law with regard to its admonition that a claimant who
makes a good faith move from his original, time-of-injury residence
must be provided with available work in the area of his new resi-
dence. This applies to workers who have moved out of state. Al-
though Kachinski does not address this issue, the pervasive doc-
trine of actual job availability demands that this be the law.190
An employer need not, however, show job availability in a myr-
iad of places in the case of a hopelessly transient claimant. As the
court held in Carrasquer v WCAB (Mader's Carpet Cleaning of
Pittsburgh, Inc.):'
Petitioner cites Yellow Freight... for the proposition that when a claim-
ant changes his residence an employer seeking to suspend benefits must
show available work in the area of the new residence. Although this is an
accurate statement of our holding. . . , we feel that a departure from our
analysis therein is warranted under the limited facts of the matter sub
judice.
We do not feel that the burden of establishing work availability in several
places or of guessing at which location it should be shown, should be borne
solely by employer, when petitioner has chosen to maintain a transient
lifestyle. 19'
In the Carrasquer case, the employer successfully demonstrated
job availability in Pittsburgh, where the claimant resided when he
suffered his injury, and where he had spent some of his time there-
after (including, notably, a stint in the custody of the sheriff).193
189. 32 Pa Commw 147, 377 A2d 1304 (1977).
190. The case has also been cited with approval in both Titusville Hosp. and in Car-
rasquer v WCAB (Mader's Carpet Cleaners of Pittsburgh, Inc.), 124 Pa Commw 385, 555
A2d 1388 (1989).
191. 124 Pa Commw 385, 555 A2d 1388 (1989).




6. Requirement of the Claimant's "Good Faith" Response
The court cases since Kachinski discussing the requirement of
the injured worker's "good faith" response are among the more in-
teresting generated in the contemporary law of job availability.
While there is some level of certainty with regard to the law in this
regard, the precise nature of the inquiry of the claimant's "good
faith" may not be settled fully. This issue is discussed more exten-
sively below.
19 4
a. The Claimant's Personal Distaste for Proposed Work
Prior to Kachinski a general rule was recognized that a claim-
ant's personal distaste or dissatisfaction was not an excuse for ig-
noring a job referral or for refusing an actual job offer. This rule
had its rather tenuous foundation in one sentence of dicta in the
commonwealth court case of State Prods. v WCAB, 9 5 in which the
court remarked that "it is certainly true that the Claimant's per-
sonal feelings about a particular job are irrelevant in this proceed-
ing if Claimant is physically capable of performing the job."'96
After Kachinski the issue was frequently raised with regard to
whether this rule survived. After all, the employer was required,
under the new regime, to make a good faith referral of work before
the claimant had a corresponding burden to follow through and
seek out the work. If the employer did not bother to try to refer
jobs which were satisfactory to the worker, did the worker really
have a duty to respond? Further, in two cases filed immediately
after Kachinski, the commonwealth court implied, in dicta, that
the referral of low-paying or "menial" job to claimants was indica-
tive of employer bad faith,197 relieving the claimant from the bur-
den of responding.
The issue was resolved in Hendry v WCAB. 9 s In that case, the
claimant had been employed as a skilled construction worker for
many years when he injured his shoulder. After a clearance by his
physician for work, a vocational counselor sent him referrals for
non-construction-industry-related jobs, referred to by the court as
"semi-skilled minimum wage jobs such as gas station manager,
194. See notes 221-45 and accompanying text.
195. 61 Pa Commw 366, 434 A2d 207 (1981).
196. State Prods., 434 A2d at 210.
197. See Four-Way Constr. Co. v WCAB (Snyder), 113 Pa Commw 235, 536 A2d 873
(1988); Young v WCAB (Weis Markets, Inc.), 113 Pa Commw 533, 537 A2d 393 (1988).
198. 133 Pa Commw 28, 577 A2d 933 (1990).
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sales-type jobs, attendant and clerk jobs . . -."" The worker re-
fused to even apply for these jobs because, among other things, he
thought that "working in a minimum wage job was not suitable,
meaningful employment and would be degrading."200 The referee
and Board, however, found this excuse insufficient to excuse a fol-
low through on job referrals, and the commonwealth court agreed:
Claimant contends that these alternative jobs were not suitable employment
under Kachinski. Claimant also contends that the Employer acted in bad
faith and is equitably estopped from reducing compensation because of Em-
ployer's failure to offer him the position of carpentry foreman....
Claimant's contention that Kachinski requires that the job referrals to a
claimant must be suitable, both medically and in the same industry or same
status, is simply not supported by that decision. The rationale behind
Kachinski was to ensure that job referrals were real, in other words, availa-
ble, and that the person was capable of performing those functions. Merely
stating that minimum wage jobs are degrading and result in a loss of self-
esteem was never intended by the Supreme Court in Kachinski to allow a
claimant to refuse alternative employment ...
Claimant's contention that for an alternative job to be suitable, it must be
in the construction industry and at the same wage as his former position, is
simply incorrect.
20 1
This basic rule has been repeated in a number of kindred scena-
rios. For example, a claimant's dislike of (1) driving on snow to
worksites in her area, and (2) working outside of the downtown
area of a small town, where she had traditionally worked, have
been declared an insufficient excuse for ignoring job referrals.0 2 In
the court's words, a "person's personal preference as to where he or
she would like to work is irrelevant as long as he or she is physi-
cally able to perform the available job.
203
Further, a claimant's refusal to apply for the job of car salesman
because he considered it "by nature a deceitful business and con-
trary to his personality" has been held an insufficient excuse.0 4 In-
deed, in the quoted case, the referee's denial of the employer's pe-
tition was reversed, with the court ordering that the claimant's
benefits be modified. °5 The claimant was also unsuccessful in ap-
pealing the reduction of his benefits where he complained that the
employer's "rehabilitation efforts were a mere attempt to avoid
199. Hendry, 577 A2d at 934.
200. Id.
201. Id at 933-34.
202. Scheib, 598 A2d 1032 (1991).
203. Scheib, 598 A2d at 1034.
204. M&D Auto Body, 599 A2d at 1020.
205. Id at 1021.
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compensation liability because many of the referred positions were
completely unrelated to any of Claimant's interests or
aptitudes."2 o6
The claimant, in addition, cannot use as an excuse for not fol-
lowing through on job referrals the explanation that the proffered
schedule did not meet with her personal needs. In Swope v WCAB
(Harry Prods., Inc.),01 the claimant while working prior to her in-
jury had children at home and, to accommodate their care, was
permitted by her employer to work a flexible shift. She then suf-
fered an injury and went off of work. Later, she recovered and was
offered appropriate light work. The offered shift, however; lacked
flexibility and thus clashed with the claimant's childcare responsi-
bilities. In her view, because of this conflict, she should not be re-
quired to work and have to hire a babysitter.
This proposition was consistently rejected in the course of the
ensuing litigation, with the commonwealth court ultimately re-
sponding that the employer need not satisfy the claimant's prefer-
ences in terms of scheduling. Rejecting the argument that the em-
ployer's "offer was not made in good faith and was unreasonable
given the pre-existing arrangement, ' '20 8 the court admonished that
there was no requirement, outside a medical limitation, that an
employer provide a flexible hourly schedule.
b. The Claimant's Sacrifice of Substantive Union Rights
Another rule, not fully accepted prior to Kachinski, was that an
exception to the general rule of State Products existed with regard
to a worker who would sacrifice significant union perquisites by ac-
cepting a modified work job which would result in a loss of signifi-
cant union benefits. In Fledderman v WCAB (Stackpole Carbon
Corp.),209 the commonwealth court held that the partially recov-
ered worker (a thirty-year union carpenter) who would, by bidding
on a job with duties within his restrictions, (1) lose all his benefits,
(2) suffer a cut in pay, and (3) lose other perquisites of work, was
not bound to follow through on pursuing such modified duty.210 He
could safely refuse the offer and stay on total disability. The com-
monwealth court, in this regard, endorsed a referee's conclusion
206. Yezovich v WCAB (USX Corp.), Pa Commw ,601 A2d 1341, 1343-44 (1992).
207. Pa Commw , 600 A2d 670 (1991).
208. Swope, 600 A2d at 671.
209. 93 Pa Commw 44, 500 A2d 215 (1985).
210. Fledderman, 500 A2d at 216-17.
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that the job was unavailable in light of the penalties and hardship
attendant upon his acceptance by him."'
The issue has now been treated in an unsatisfactory post-
Kachinski case, St. Joe Container Co. v WCAB (Staroschuck).1
In this new case, the claimant refused to return to work at a newly-
created, non-union job doing light duty. The claimant had been a
member of the union before his injury for thirty-six years and was
eleventh or twelfth on the plant seniority list. It was stipulated,
apparently, that if he had taken the non-union job for more than
six months, he would have lost his union seniority. As the job was,
however, apparently within the worker's restrictions, the referee
indefinitely modified the claimant's benefits. The Board reversed,
ruling that the claimant was entitled to reinstatement on total dis-
ability after the six months passed; at that point, in the Board's
.view, the job was no longer "available."
On appeal, the commonwealth court affirmed. While it was true
that the new, non-union job also had benefit programs and other
perquisites, the loss of union status which would have resulted af-
ter six months rendered the job unavailable. The court in this re-
gard cursorily cited Fledderman and reinstated the referee's
award.21 3
St. Joe Container is unsatisfactory because of its failure to pro-
vide a single word of analysis, implying instead that virtually any
loss in union seniority by a worker because of the offer of modified
work would render a job unavailable. The cursory citation to Fled-
derman was no basis for such an omission, as that case had ex-
traordinary facts. As the dissenting Judge Silvestri pointed out, in
Fledderman the factual picture was one of a worker suffering sig-
nificant penalties because of his acceptance of a modified duty
job.214 The picture in Fledderman was also complicated by the fact
that the claimant was only off of his regular job for eleven weeks
anyway; 1 5 hence, as the court noted, he would have sacrificed de-
cades of union seniority to start from scratch again when his disa-
bility was only fleeting-a massive sacrifice for a trivial injury and
period of time off work. As discussed above, there was no such sac-
rifice in the St. Joe Container case.
As the dissent also correctly pointed out, the seeming "blanket-
211. Id at 217.
212. 141 Pa Commw 672, 596 A2d 1193, alloc granted, Pa , 600 A2d 542 (1991).
213. St. Joe Container Co., 596 A2d at 1195.




rule" announced created a double-standard in the compensation
law which favors union members:
[The Act] contains no provisions for continuation of disability benefits to
claimants who refuse non-union work. The holding advocated by the major-
ity engrafts upon the Workmen's Compensation Act, as well as upon
Kachinski, an exception for union members; refusal of available work which
neither the legislature nor the Supreme Court saw fit to provide. 1
If the St. Joe Container case should thus be looked upon with
grave reservation, it also seems to be the law and its strictures
should be looked upon with vigilance by employers seeking to pro-
vide light duty to union-member employees. It is submitted, how-
ever, that the opinion does not mean that any claimant who hap-
pens to hold a union card can pick and choose among proffered
jobs. Some tangible sacrifice, clearly identifiable, must be involved
before a non-union or reduced-status job should be found unavail-
able. A rule which would permit a union member, as opposed to a
non-union member, to remain on compensation while others must
return to appropriate work has both equal protection implications
and in any event would result in the courts generating a status
society among disabled workers. Such a result is, of course,
unacceptable.
c. Response by the Retired or Incarcerated Claimant
It is not an excuse, under the current law of job availability, for
a worker to decline to follow through on job referrals on the
grounds that he or she is retired and has no intention of pursuing
work. The receipt of social security retirement, or even social se-
curity disability, is not, similarly, good grounds for a refusal. This
principle is at least inferable from Dugan v WCAB (Fuller Co. of
Catasauqua),217 in which the claimant had indicated unequivocally
that "he [was] retired and will no longer attempt to obtain employ-
ment. '218 In that case, the court eventually held that the employer
did not have to show job availability at all in the presence of such
an attitude, as the worker had forever removed himself from the
job market even though he had been cleared for a return to work.
Such a response, of course, actually transcends good faith or bad
faith, and simply reflects the decision of an individual to divorce
216. St. Joe Container Co., 596 A2d at 1196 (Silvestri dissenting).
217. 131 Pa Commw 218, 569 A2d 1038 (1990).
218. Dugan, 569 A2d at 1041.
1992
Duquesne Law Review
himself from the workplace altogether. 19
Aged claimants are thus well advised not to respond to job refer-
rals or the inquiries of vocational counselors with such replies. To
the contrary, if cleared for work, a good faith effort must normally
be undertaken to return to work (assuming, of course, that the
medical and vocational restrictions are appropriate). It is possible
that such action, if successful, could result in a reduction of retire-
ment or other non-compensation disability or old age benefits.
An incarcerated claimant cannot seriously be expected to make a
good faith effort to follow through on job referrals or accept job
offers. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the commonwealth court
views the claimant's inability to follow through to be due to his
own fault, and the claimant's failure to follow through should re-
sult in reduction of benefits.22 0 Like an unequivocal retiree, the ra-
tionalization of this rule may also be the entirely reasonable pro-
position that the claimant has, through his own volition, removed
himself from the job market and cannot respond to referrals of
work.
d. The Claimant's Good Faith-The Nature of the Inquiry
and a Proposed Test
Common sense would seem to demand that the issue of whether
a claimant has undertaken a "good faith follow through"2 21 on a
job referral is a pure question of fact for the referee to decide on a
case-by-case basis. It is appropriate that the individual who actu-
ally sees the claimant and analyzes the evidence firsthand makes
the critical determination of whether the worker has earnestly
sought out the proffered work or has, to the contrary, acted in bad
faith or actually "sabotaged" an interview.
The commonwealth court has, in fact, plainly implied this. In
Murphy v WCAB (Roadway Express),222 the court insisted that a
finding of bad faith must be made by the referee before reduction
in benefits can be ordered when the claimant actually follows
through on a job referral yet fails to get the job.
In Murphy, the worker was referred to a job but did not get an
offer of employment. The referee made no finding on why he did
219. Id ("claimant's loss of earnings was caused by his voluntary retirement and with-
drawal from the labor market").
220. Brown v WCAB (City of Pittsburgh), 134 Pa Commw 31, 578 A2d 69 (1990).
221. Kachinski, 532 A2d at 380.
222. 142 Pa Commw 416, 598 A2d 87 (1991).
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not get the job, yet still reduced the claimant's benefits. The Board
affirmed but the commonwealth court found the omission of the
fact-finding to merit remand:
Lack of good faith cannot be imputed to Claimant where he attempted to
obtain a position with YMCA of Hanover and the evidence is uncontra-
dicted that he applied for the position but was not hired ...
[Kachinski] requires that an adverse credibility determination be made
concerning the claimant's testimony of good faith efforts to secure a job
before any modification of claimant's benefits.
22 3
Because the court demands that a credibility determination be
made on the good faith/bad faith issue, it seems apparent that
such a determination should be deemed purely one within the
power of the referee to make.
This proposition is borne out in another case, in which the com-
monwealth court insisted that the referee must make findings as to
whether or not various excuses for the claimant not going to inter-
views constitute "reasonable bases" for the same. In Koolvent Alu-
minum Prods., Inc. v WCAB (Allman),224 the claimant had not
gone to certain interviews, prompting the employer to file for mod-
ification. The claimant offered a number of excuses for those fail-
ures, including the explanation that he was "waiting to hear from
another employer," and also that he "had been involved in a fight"
and was thus "out of town for a few days."22'
The referee mentioned these excuses, yet ultimately denied the
modification petition. He made no findings as to whether the ex-
cuses were reasonable or were advanced in good faith by the
worker.
The commonwealth court found this unsatisfactory. In its view,
it could not determine whether the claimant had advanced the ex-
cuses in good faith or bad faith without a specific finding from the
referee as to whether or not the proffered reasons "constituted rea-
sonable bases for failure to follow up on three of the job referrals
... . We do not believe that these reasons necessarily preclude
following up in some way on job referrals. ' 226 Accordingly, the
court returned the case to the referee to make specific findings as
to whether the claimant's excuses for not following through on the
job referrals were made in good faith.
When such findings are ultimately made, they are surely en-
223. Murphy, 598 A2d at 90 (footnote omitted).
224. 134 Pa Commw 505, 578 A2d 1020 (1990).




graved in stone in the vast majority of cases. The referee is the
finder of fact22 and is the only entity to make judgments as to a
claimant's good or bad faith in the course of the job placement
process.
This is certainly the lesson of Champion Home Builders v
WCAB (Ickes).225 In that case, the claimant had been cleared for
work and then actually went on interviews. He failed to receive any
offers. The employer then sought modification on the theory that
the claimant had sabotaged the job interviews by revealing to the
potential employers various opinions of his own concerning his
ability to work.
The referee nevertheless denied the modification petition. The
commonwealth court affirmed, pointing to the referee as the all-
powerful and important figure in this regard.229 While it was true,
the court reasoned, that the claimant put down on his applications
information which might dissuade potential employers, no bad
faith was necessarily to be inferred.
The referee, in this regard, had interpreted the claimant's re-
sponses as "trying to be honest . . . concerning his disability
[since] he was unsure of his physical ability to perform [the vari-
ous] job[s]."2 s0 On this record, no error was found. The critical le-
gal principle employed was simply that it was the referee who, as
the fact-finder, has the ability to judge the bad faith or good faith
of the claimant's response to a job referral.31
While it should thus be beyond contention that the referee is the
arbiter of "good faith" in terms of the claimant's response, the
commonwealth court has at times indicated a willingness to deter-
mine that certain responses are simply unacceptable as a matter of
law. For example, as discussed above, a claimant's subjective dis-
pleasure with a job, its hours, status or wages, is irrelevant, and it
thus follows that vigorous articulation of these aspects of dissatis-
227. The referee in workmen's compensation cases is, of course, the finder-of-fact and
"arbiter of credibility." See Universal Cyclops Steel. Corp. v WCAB, 9 Pa Commw 176, 305
A2d 757, 760 (1973) (citations omitted).
228. 136 Pa Commw 612, 585 A2d 550 (1990).
229. Champion Home Builders, 585 A2d at 554.
230. Id.
231. See also Yezovich, 601 A2d 1341 (1992) (referee's factual finding that claimant
had not exercised good faith in pursuing job referrals was supported by evidence which
revealed that claimant did not properly fill out applications, at times did not file them at all,
and often delayed in pursing open jobs; referee's finding that "'claimant had no real inter-




faction by a claimant on an interview should be bad faith as a mat-
ter of law. Certainly it is no excuse, as a matter of law, for not
going on an interview. 32
This proposition is illustrated by the commonwealth court's re-
cent overthrow of a referee's fact-finding on the issue. In M&D
Auto Body, Inc. v WCAB (Pallot),2 33 for example, the referee had
made a finding that the claimant,' who thought that selling cars
was distasteful to him and inconsistent with his personality,
"lacked the personality or vocational ability to be a car sales-
man,''234 and thus excused his failure to follow through on a refer-
ral to such work. The court, however, overthrew that finding and
reduced the claimant's benefits. In the court's view, the record in-
dicated that the claimant was vocationally capable of performing
the job, since he had a background in the automotive field, and the
referee should not have taken into account the claimant's views
and the fact that the worker thought the job was degrading.2 5
Likewise, a union worker's refusal to follow through on a re-
ferred job, though offering good wages, benefits and perquisites, is
justified as a matter of law236 and it is apparently not "bad faith,"
if the job would entail sacrifice of union status or perquisites. A
finding by a referee of bad faith on the basis of a worker passing
up desirable, otherwise conforming jobs on this basis will likely be
reversed.
Precisely what constitutes good faith or bad faith is thus to be
determined on a case-by-case basis. Plainly, however, a worker who
ignores job referrals without clear medical justification is at grave
risk of being found to have lacked good faith.23 7 Further, the com-
monwealth court has indicated that if both the treating and inde-
pendent medical examination physicians clear the worker for a re-
turn to employment, the claimant is virtually obliged to follow
through lest he or she necessarily sacrifice disability payments. In-
deed, in Acme Markets v WCAB (Pilvalis),23 s the court implied
that a referee may capriciously disregard the evidence if he fails to
reduce the benefits of a worker who ignores jobs specifically ap-
232. See notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
233. Pa Commw , 599 A2d 1016 (1991).
234. M&D Auto Body, 599 A2d at 1020.
235. Id at 1020-21.
236. See notes 209-216 and accompanying text.
237. See, for example, Cashmark v WCAB (Great A&P Tea Co.), 135 Pa Commw 464,
580 A2d 1189, 1191 (1990).
238. 142 Pa Commw 400, 597 A2d 294 (1991).
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proved by both treating and independent medical examination
physicians. 2 39 Further, in cases of clear "sabotage" of interviews, it
is not difficult for a referee to determine that a claimant has acted
in bad faith. Behaving in a patently hostile or uncooperative man-
ner, appearing unclean or unkempt, declaring that non-union busi-
nesses are a "rip-off, '240 insisting that he or she is only at the in-
terview because the "rehabilitation girl told me I had to,"24 and
skipping of or arriving at job interviews late without justification
are all simple examples of a claimant's responses which are likely
to be found "in bad faith."
One union-sponsored publication has wisely advised workers
that they respond in the following manner, lest they needlessly
sacrifice disability benefits:
Before you apply, make sure you have spoken with your doctor and have a
good understanding of your actual physical restrictions.
When applying for jobs, be sure to:
1. Be prompt for the interview.
2. Be courteous.
3. Get the name of the person with whom you meet and keep notes as to
when and where you applied and what was said.
4. Obtain a detailed description of the job, including its physical
requirements.
5. Tell the interviewer of your doctor's restrictions and ask whether the job
is within these restrictions. 4"
The foregoing is consistent with the cases. Importantly, further,
the communication to the potential employer of the fact that the
potential employee has suffered an injury and has restrictions is
not bad faith243 in lieu of any evidence that revealing the informa-
239. Acme Markets, 597 A2d at 298. In this case, the claimant was cleared for modi-
fied work by both the employer's and the claimant's physician, but she thereafter ignored
effective job referrals. In the course of a subsequent modification petition, the employer
produced as evidence both the general clearances and specific job approvals from the physi-
cians indicating that the claimant could do the work. The referee, however, denied the peti-
tion, concluding that the claimant could not do the work. The Board affirmed.
The commonwealth court, however, reversed. The expert evidence was uncontradicted
that claimant could do work. In the court's view, the referee had "capriciously disregarded"
that evidence. In other words, as far as the court was concerned, a rationally thinking indi-
vidual, faced with uncontradicted evidence that the claimant could work, had to accept it. It
would be "capricious" to ignore or disregard the evidence. Senior Judge Barry dissented,
alleging that the majority had intruded on the fact-finding power of the referee, and he was
probably right. Id at 299 (Barry dissenting).
240. See, for example, Torrey, Pa. Workmen's Compensation Newsletter at Appendix
I (cited in note 117).
241. Id.
242. Martin K. Brigham, Injured on the Job at 107 (PHILAPOSH, 3d ed 1991).
243. See W & L Sales Co. v WCAB (Drake), 123 Pa Commw 158, 552 A2d 1177 (1989),
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tion is a mere ruse to avoid being hired. Presumably the potential
employer already knows of such information in a properly adminis-
tered job search, since the major elaboration of Young v WCAB
(Weis Markets),244 demands at the outset that the job counselor
ascertain whether the potential employer would seriously consider
an application from the employee.
Although the determination as to lack of cooperation or "sabo-
tage" will always be made on a case-by-case basis, it is submitted
that the following criteria is appropriate as a test to determine
whether the worker is appropriately responding to job referrals
under Kachinski. In this regard, a claimant does not follow
through in good faith if he or she:
(1) does anything of a material nature (a) at the interview or (b) in the
interview/job referral process
(2) which a reasonable, honest and open individual
(3) would not do if he or she wished seriously to be considered for the po-
tential job.
It should always be borne in mind, of course, that an excuse for
not following through at all is reliance upon a medical opinion re-
stricting the worker from the rigors of the proposed
employment.2
4 5
7. Employer "Good Faith"
The Kachinski court also spoke, of course, of the employer's
"good faith" in the context of the job availability/job placement
process. The court, in this regard, declared that "the viability of
this system depends on the good faith of the participants," and
with regard to employers, insisted that the job "referrals . . .must
be tailored to the claimant's abilities . . . , and be made in a good
faith attempt to return the injured employee to productive em-
ployment, rather than a mere attempt to avoid paying
compensation,
246
The interpretation of this latter phrase has been the subject of
significant debate. To a certain extent the language itself is unfor-
tunate, as it seems to ignore the economic reality of the workmen's
compensation system as an insurance program for replacement of
aff'd per curiam, 524 Pa 591, 574 A2d 603 (1990).
244. 113 Pa Commw 533, 537 A2d 393 (1988). See notes 122-28 and accompanying
text.
245. See, for example, Roadway Express, Inc. v WCAB (Lewis), 113 Pa Commw 230,
536 A2d 870 (1988).
246. Kachinski, 532 A2d at 380.
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wages. Although it is true that the compensation system was also
the result of remedial legislation with a humane purpose, and that
provision of an impaired worker with a job is an appropriate rem-
edy in the system, the fact is that a responsibly acting insurance
company or employer will always have, as a motive in demonstrat-
ing a worker's change from total to partial disability, a reduction in
its compensation liability. Indeed, an employer or insurance com-
pany that does not move in such a direction and seek to avoid pay-
ing compensation is probably acting irresponsibly with regard to
its duties to keep premiums reasonable and/or to make the insurer
or employment entity profitable.
As 0a result of this oversight, arguments have occasionally been
advanced that the employer or insurance carrier must possess vir-
tually charitable motivations in the course of a vocational place-
ment effort to make such an undertaking legitimate under Kachin-
ski. Employer admissions as to interest in gaining an order of
partial disability to reduce liability is thereupon painted as bad
faith and an egregious sin. It is submitted, of course, that insisting
that employers and insurance carriers undertake job placement
motivated solely by the tenets of Judaeo-Christian ethics is both
unrealistic and surely not intended by the Kachinski court. The
employer's burden has not, in fact, been interpreted in this man-
ner. The commonwealth court has, instead, deferred almost com-
pletely to the referee in making the determination of whether the
employer's efforts have been undertaken in good faith. The court
has also rejected the notion that the offer of lower status and lower
paying jobs by an employer to an employee, or refusing to offer
work at the time-of-injury employer, constitutes bad faith.
Illustrative of both of these propositions is Hendry v WCAB
(Miller & Norford, Inc.),24 7 where the employer, rather than offer-
ing the claimant a light duty job at the original employment site,
hired a vocational counselor to locate a variety of jobs outside of
his field, some paying minimum wage and possessing little social
status.
This approach was assailed in the commonwealth court by the
claimant, who had appealed the reduction of his benefits. The alle-
gation that the employer's behavior lacked good faith was rejected:
The rationale behind Kachinski was to ensure that job referrals were real,
in other words, available, and that the person was capable of performing
those functions. Merely stating that minimum wages jobs are degrading and
247. 133 Pa Commw 28, 577 A2d 933 (1990).
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result in a loss of self-esteem was never intended by the Supreme Court in
Kachinski to allow a claimant to refuse alternative employment ...
Claimant argues that [not rehiring him] constitutes bad faith and estops
Employer from asserting that there was suitable employment available....
Claimant's contention that for an alternative job to be suitable, it must be
in the construction industry and at the same wage as his former industry, is
simply incorrect.
248
The court ruled in the same manner in Yezovich v WCAB (USX
Corp.) .249 In that case the claimant, whose benefits had been modi-
fied by the referee, argued that the employer's "rehabilitation ef-
forts were a mere attempt to avoid compensation liability because
many of the referred positions were completely unrelated to any of
Claimant's interests or aptitudes."2 50 This allegation was rejected,
with the court adopting the view expressed in Hendry and pointing
to the apparently undisputed medical clearance of the worker for
modified work.2 51 In Swope v WCAB (Harry Prods., Inc.),2 52 like-
wise, the court rejected an argument that the employer had given
the claimant a "bad faith offer '25 3 in not referring back to the
worker her time-of-injury schedule which had accommodated her
childcare duties.
That the commonwealth court considers the determination of
whether an employer has acted in good faith to be one for the refe-
ree is certainly exhibited in Andromalos-Dale v WCAB (U.S. Air,
Inc.).254 In that case, the rehabilitation counselor had not revealed
to the claimant the possible consequences (reduction of benefits) of
not following through on job referrals, and this failure was alleged
to reflect bad faith. This argument met with disagreement by the
court, which pointed to the referee's findings and its own limited
scope of review:
Claimant's argument that the Employer and its rehabilitation counselor ac-
ted in bad faith is without merit. Questions regarding the weight and credi-
bility of evidence are reserved for the referee, and we may not engage in
substituting our opinions of credibility for the factfinder's .... The referee
expressly found that the Claimant in this case was not credible, and that
the rehabilitation counselor was credible. The referee further found that the
rehabilitation counselor acted in a reasonable and responsible manner, and
248. Hendry, 577 A2d at 934-35.
249. Pa Commw , 601 A2d 1341 (1992).
250. Yezovich, 601 A2d at 1343-44.
251. Id at 1344.
252. Pa Commw , 600 A2d 670 (1991).
253. Swope, 600 A2d at 670-71.
254. Pa Commw , 599 A2d 304 (1991).
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we may not conclude that the referee was obliged to believe any evidence. 255
A similar result ensued in the novel case of Jayne v WCAB
(King Fifth Wheel),2" 6 in which the claimant was offered work at
the time-of-injury employer, and was told to accept by 7:00 a.m.
He failed to call, however, until 1:00 p.m., at which point the em-
ployer indicated that the job was no longer available. After a re-
duction in benefits, the claimant appealed, complaining that the
"Employer's offer lacked good faith because when he called to ac-
cept the job, Employer withdrew its offer.
'257
This was a fairly credible complaint; indeed, the employer "gave
as its only reason for the withdrawal" the claimant's simple failure
to follow the instruction.2 58 Nevertheless, the commonwealth court
declined to overthrow the findings of the referee, implying, in fact,
that it sensed that the claimant himself was responsible for the
delay.
Obviously, some employer conduct will signal patent bad faith.
The Kachinski case, in this regard, does speak of a return to "pro-
ductive employment." Thus, the hoary practice of returning indus-
trial workers to unproductive make-work jobs-full-time sharpen-
ing of pencils, mopping the white lines in the company parking lot,
etc.-is likely to be found to reflect bad faith. The key here is not
that the job is "made up" or specially created, but that it is utterly
unproductive.
Further, a claimant can always try to reveal presumptively legiti-
mate employer conduct as actually lacking good faith. For exam-
ple, if in Hendry the claimant had determined that the employer
had secretly decided to "dump" the claimant and had directed the
vocational counselor "to send the creep to every low-class job in
town," bad faith will likely be found. Likewise, if in Swope the
claimant had proven that the offer of conflicting work-shifts was
motivated by a plot to rid the employer of an undesirable em-
ployee, bad faith would probably have been shown. Finally, if the
employee could demonstrate that in Jayne the employer was en-
gaging in game playing and had rescinded the offer of light duty as
part of a scheme to provoke litigation and have the claimant's ben-
efits suspended, bad faith would probably be shown. A referee's
finding of bad faith in these instances should be effective on appeal
255. Andromalos-Dale, 599 A2d at 306-07.
256. 137 Pa Commw 211, 585 A2d 604 (1991).




when supported by substantial, competent evidence.
V. WHEN JOB AVAILABILITY MUST BE SHOWN
As evident from part II of this article, for fifty years Pennsylva-
nia law included a law of job availability which dealt frequently
with when job availability had to be shown, with little attention
being given to what job availability really meant and how it was to
be shown. The Kachinski case turned that trend on its head, defin-
ing job availability carefully and establishing guidelines for its
demonstration, spawning at the same time a myriad of subsequent
interpretative cases to further define the law.
Another line of cases, however, continued to deal with and ex-
pand the law dealing with when job availability must be shown.
The leading cases of Barrett and Petrone established, of course,
that it was always the employer that had the burden of proof in
this regard. The only issue in this context was and is, accordingly,
when the employer must take on this burden.
In the years between Barrett and Kachinski, a number of cases
revealed the commonwealth court applying Barrett and imposing
liability for total disability on employers (1) when they sought par-
tial reduction in benefits but failed to show job availability,5 9 and
(2) when they unsuccessfully tried to fight off claim petitions with
open-ended disability, where there had been no intervening offer of
conforming modified work.260 Some cases also dealt with the conse-
quences of an employee's voluntary withdrawal from the market-
place" 1 or loss of earnings because of misconduct;26 2 in such in-
stances, the employer was held not to be required to show job
availability. These cases all remain good law, but the law has been
tremendously supplemented.
A. Roots of the Present Law
As the commonwealth court, under the leadership of Judge Bar-
bieri, began to construct what was to become the foundation of the
Kachinski requirements, it also began to further expand the cir-
cumstances under which the employer had to take on the burden
259. See, for example, Billante v Stouffer Foods, Inc., 7 Pa Commw 532, 300 A2d 284
(1973).
260. See, for example, Steinle v WCAB, 38 Pa Commw 241, 393 A2d 503 (1978).
261. P.P.G. Indus., Inc. v WCAB, 12 Pa Commw 61, 315 A2d 906 (1974) (claimant left
work to go to ministry school).
262. WCAB v J.W. Galbreath & Co., 20 Pa Commw 283, 341 A2d 541 (1975).
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of showing job availability. The cases generated the general rule
(now subject to exceptions) that unless a worker is totally recov-
ered, as certified by a physician, job availability must be shown for
an employer to be entitled to an order of partial disability. 83 This
rule has as its basis the proposition that a worker who has suffered
an injury is entitled to a presumption of continuing disability
26 4
which is only defeated by medical evidence of total recovery or ob-
jective evidence of partial recovery, i.e., working at or being pro-
vided with an actually available job.
The cases generated during this new undertaking, which this
writer will refer to as the Busche/Fells2 5 line of cases, are different
procedurally from those before, because they all deal with job
availability in the context of the claimant's attempts to gain rein-
statement to compensation, especially after an economic layoff or
similar event. As implied by the general rule stated above, the new
cases hold that such a worker is entitled to reinstatement unless
there is a showing of a new job available within the prescribed
medical and vocational restrictions.
The accession of this rule was a revolution in its own right and is
greatly in contradiction to the prior practice and conception of
workmen's compensation. Traditionally, it was taken for granted
that a worker who was capable of laboring but was then laid off, or
had his job eliminated, or lost hours because of economic condi-
tions, had suffered wage loss not because of his injury but because
of non-work-related developments and was not to receive work-
men's compensation. Many years of cases had, after all, taught
that workmen's compensation was not supposed to compensate for
non-work-related losses of earning power266 and was distinct from
unemployment or welfare.
In addition, Section 413 of the Act 267 seemed (and seems) to pro-
vide a basis for disallowing reinstatement of laid-off workers or
263. See Economy Decorators, Inc. v WCAB (Federici), 96 Pa Commw 208, 506 A2d
1357 (1986).
264. See Economy Decorators, Inc., 506 A2d 1357 (1986).
265. See notes 271-79 and accompanying text; 288-90 and accompanying text.
266. See, for example, Yednock v Hayle Brook Coal Co., 109 Pa Super 182, 185 (1933)
("The compensation act is not designed to afford insurance against unemployment, and the
fact that work is not procurable does not prove that a man is not capable of performing it").
See also Babcock v Babcock & Wilcox Co., 137 Pa Super 517, 9 A2d 492, 495 (1939) ("It is
the purpose of this act to compensate an injured employee for loss of earning power due to
an accident but it is not intended to cover losses arising from fluctuations in the labor
market").
267. 77 Pa Stat Ann § 772 (Purdon Supp 1991).
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others who had suffered a renewed loss of earning power for non-
work-related reasons. It provides, in pertinent part, that:
where compensation has been suspended ... payments under the agree-
ment or award may be resumed at any time during the period for which
compensation for partial disability is payable, unless it be shown that the
loss in earnings does not result from the disability due to the injury. 68
Of course, a worker who has returned to his time-of-injury job
on a suspension, laboring at full tilt, but is then laid off, has suf-
fered a loss of earnings which does not result from the disability
due to the injury, but instead from economic conditions.
Finally, it is to be recalled that traditionally the showing of job
availability was merely a conceptual matter, demonstrated by as
little as a physician's testimony with regard to (1) partial medical
recovery, and (2) the theoretical ability of the worker to do some
sort of light duty occupation.269 Only when the worker had a "non-
descript" level of disability did the employer have to actually pro-
vide the worker a real job in order to gain an order of partial disa-
bility. Accordingly, the thought of bearing the burden of providing
an actual job to the claimant for as long as he or she had impair-
ment was totally inconceivable until the last ten years. It was dur-
ing this period of time, as we have seen, that the commonwealth
court launched the "cultural revolution" which discarded the no-
tion of the conceptual showing of job availability, replacing it with
the requirement that the job be actually communicated and be ac-
tually available.
The general rule stated above has nevertheless developed. The
quick evolution of the rule in the case law is truly remarkable and,
as submitted above, constitutes a revolution in its own right. Just
as Kachinski and the cases which preceded and followed it
changed the concept of what job availability consisted of, so has
the new line of procedural cases changed the traditional require-
ment of a one-time .requirement of showing job availability to a
regime which requires a continual showing of an actually available
job.
The following discussion recounts the evolution of the new rule.
As will be seen, to a great extent the new general rule was devel-
oped without reference to either the statute or the principle that
workmen's compensation is meant to cover loss of earnings for
work-related injuries, not to be a vehicle for insuring employment.
268. Id.
269. See note 33 and accompanying text.
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B. Establishing the New Law
The new regime was established in a series of commonwealth
court opinions filed between 1983 and 1988. Many of these cases
remain good law while others have probably been displaced by the
recent case of Pieper v Ametek-Thermox Instruments Div.,27 ° the
supreme court's declaration as to the law on when job availability
must be shown. This case is discussed in a succeeding section.
The progenitor of the cases remains good law. In Busche v
WCAB (Townsend & Bottum, Inc.),7 1 the court dealt with the is-
sue of whether an injured worker who has returned to a specially-
created job, which is thereafter eliminated, is entitled to resump-
tion of total disability benefits. The worker in Busche had been
provided with a sedentary job which, after four years, was phased
out and the claimant was offered his regular job back. 2
At least one school of thought would insist that the worker was
not so entitled-after all, the claimant's actual return to work and
his proven history of labor was objective evidence that he was only
partially disabled. Objective evidence had been shown once, and
that resolved the partial disability question. If the claimant wanted
resumption of benefits, he would have to show a worsening of his
condition.
2 73
It was, significantly, Judge Barbieri who put this conceptual no-
tion to rest. Invoking Barrett, the court conclusorily stated:
[Claimant's benefits were effectively suspended while he was back at the
specially-created job, and] in cases such as this one . . . , if it is shown in
the reinstatement proceeding that Claimant's total disability continued, re-
lieved only by his period of reemployment in a "specially created job," proof
of the discontinuance of such employment is Claimant's only burden and an
employer who chooses not to continue payments must then ... assume the
burden to establish the existence of the selective job that Claimant is able
to perform.
2 74
It should be recalled that this rule was established at the same
time that Judge Barbieri was spearheading the parallel drive in
270. 526 Pa 25, 584 A2d 301 (1990).
271. 77 Pa Commw 469, 466 A2d 278 (1983).
272. The Board, for example, often took this position. See, for example, Oshinski v
WCAB (Lincoln Bank), 86 Pa Commw 181, 484 A2d 225 (1984) (Board ruled that the claim-
ant, once she "established an earning power, despite her continuing disability, has thus
shifted the burden of proof from the employer to herself [in the context of a reinstatement
petition] requiring that she prove that her physical condition had changed ..
273. Busche, 466 A2d at 279.
274. Id at 280.
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terms of defining the elements of job availability.275 Accordingly, at
this point it was understood that the above language meant that
the employer would have to provide another specially created job
at the worksite or another location if it wished to secure another
order of suspension or modification to partial disability.
Any thought that the case was limited to its facts was soon put
to rest. A few months later the court again held that a worker who
had returned to modified work on a suspension, but was then laid
off because of an economic downturn, was entitled to resume total
disability in lieu of a showing of a new, actually available job.276 On
this occasion, the Board had held to the contrary, implying that
were the rule such, the employer would be "forever an insurer of
job availability to a partially disabled claimant ....
This concern of the Board was not directly answered by the
commonwealth court. The court did say that if a worker were to
lose earning power because of misconduct, or because of with-
drawal from the marketplace, or because of a subsequent em-
ployer's discharge of the worker, the employer would not be re-
sponsible for showing job availability.278 In other circumstances,
however, the court essentially held that the employer was a guar-
antor or insurer of work. The court was unsatisfied, in this regard,
that a one-time showing should be the test, and then fully ratified
the spirit of the Busche rule:
This is a situation which has a unique potential for abuse if the employer
can forever meet the burden of showing job availability by providing a mod-
ified job for a partially disabled claimant ....
We hold that under the present facts, the partially disabled claimant who
has been laid off from a modified job provided by the Employer and seeks
reinstatement of benefits, has met her burden of proof by showing that she
is unable to perform her time-of-injury job. The Employer then has the bur-
den of proving the availability of work which Claimant is capable of
performing .... 27
Further expansion of the rule was soon to follow,280 and the
275. See notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
276. Smith v WCAB (Futura Indus.), 80 Pa Commw 508, 471 A2d 1304 (1984).
277. Smith, 471 A2d at 1305.
278. Id at 1306 n 4.
279. Id at 1306 n 4, 1307.
280. See, for example, Palmiere v WCAB (East End Trucking), 91 Pa Commw 137,
496 A2d 918 (1985) (claimant was entitled to reinstatement of total disability where he had
undertaken light duty running his own grocery, but then, three years later, "lost that busi-
ness"). See also Venanzio v WCAB (Eastern Express), 88 Pa Commw 204, 489 A2d 284
(1985) (claimant had no burden to show worsening of condition, in lieu of showing of job
availability, where referee had previously found that worker could "'return to his regular
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Busche/Fells cases soon joined with the actual job requirement of
Kachinski to create a basic vocational rehabilitation/job placement
program for partially disabled workers in Pennsylvania.
A further landmark unfolded in 1985 with the commonwealth
court's decision in Economy Decorators, Inc. v WCAB (Feder-
ici).281 In that case, the claimant had been injured but returned to
his regular job, as a paperhanger, for certain periods on a suspen-
sion. During one of these periods the claimant had wages less than
his average weekly wage, and a referee awarded partial disability
benefits for the period.282 This aspect of the award was challenged
on appeal by the employer, which argued that it had presented evi-
dence that the reduced earnings during the critical period were due
to "depressed economic conditions [which] resulted in decreased
work availability and forced [the employer] to apportion all availa-
ble work among [its] employees. [During this time, the claimant]
never complained of difficulty in performing his work load. . . and
he was anxious and able to accept additional overtime employment
when available.
'28 3
The commonwealth court, however, held that, without evidence
of an available job with earnings sufficient to suspend the worker's
compensation, partial disability was owing. The reasoning was
found in the Busche court's prior holding:
The status of the employer's liability under a workmen's compensation
agreement or award continues irrespective of whether or not payments have
ceased to be made....
We note that Busche and progeny are factually distinguishable from the
case sub judice in that the employers there discontinued specially-created
jobs. Nevertheless, we find the premise applicable here. . . . A presumptive
partial disability exists by virtue of the order to suspend compensation;
the employer can eliminate liability only by offering suitable work. As no
such offer was forthcoming here, the employer has not met his burden ...
[T]he claimant simply must show that, while his disability continued, his
loss of earnings has recurred.
2 84
job of truck driver with a partial disability of an undetermined percentage not reflected in
loss of earning power,'" but where claimant had never actually returned); Oshinski v
WCAB (Lincoln Bank), 86 Pa Commw 181, 484 A2d 225 (1984) (claimant had no burden to
show worsening of condition, and was entitled to reinstatement, in lieu of showing job avail-
ability, where claimant quit light duty and in good faith followed husband to Shamokin,
where she could not find work). See also generally Schafer v WCAB (Lehigh Valley Man-
Power Program), 93 Pa Commw 458, 501 A2d 708 (1985) (general rule applied).
281. 96 Pa Commw 208, 506 A2d 1357 (1986).
282. Economy Decorators, 506 A2d at 1358-59.
283. Id at 1359.
284. Id at 1360.
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The articulation of the "presumption of partial disability" was
to have significant influence on court decisions, as seen below. The
supr6me court has also discussed the notion but has altered it ma-
terially.185 At the time that the Economy Decorators opinion was
filed, however, there were significant questions raised as to the
seemingly all-encompassing language of the court's decision, which
remain as serious challenges to the correctness of the decision.
Most importantly, the court recited the language of Section 413 as
to the circumstances under which a claimant is entitled to rein-
statement, but failed to recognize and enforce the clear provision
applicable to the facts at hand that a worker is not entitled to par-
tial disability when the employer demonstrates that the "loss of
earnings does not result from the disability due to injury." In the
case at hand, the employer had plainly shown that the loss of earn-
ings was due to an economic downturn and that the claimant was
more than eager to do all his job tasks.
As a result, it was plain that the claimant had not lost earnings
because of his injury-related disability. Yet, the court ignored the
statute and announced that a presumption of partial disability was
to apply to allow reinstatement in the case, since the presumption
could only be overcome by showing job availability.
It is submitted that this was simply plain error, generated by of
a failure-or refusal-to read the plain language of the applicable
statute. A loss of earning power not caused by a work injury was
never intended to be covered by workmen's compensation,288 and
this principle is found not only in the cases but in the statute it-
self. To ignore these aspects of the law and impose an indefinite
burden of showing job availability no matter what the cause of the
loss of earnings is manifestly incorrect. It is significant, in this re-
gard, that Judge Barbieri in his treatise mentions nothing about
such a presumption and insists instead that a worker must show a
change in condition before he or she is entitled to a resumption of
benefits.
2 7
The rule has been partially overthrown in Pieper, as discussed
below. In the meantime, however, a flurry of cases from the com-
monwealth court rushed to ratify the purported ironclad force of
the presumption. The cases continued to ignore Section 413 of the
Act and its prohibition against providing workmen's compensation
285. See notes 301-19 and accompanying text.
286. See note 268 and accompanying text.
287. Barbieri, Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation § 6.21(3) at 76 (cited in note
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to workers who suffer a loss of earnings for non-work-related rea-
sons such as lay-off.
In Fells v WCAB (Caterpillar Tractor Co.),28s the claimant had
returned to his time-of-injury job but was then laid off due to eco-
nomic conditions. The referee and the Board had denied reinstate-
ment because the claimant had been working at his time-of-injury
job and did not lose his earning power because of the work injury.
Further, the claimant had not shown a worsening in his
condition.289
The commonwealth court reversed, addressing specifically the
fact that the claimant had returned to his regular job and recount-
ing in full its view of the burden of proof aspect of the job availa-
bility law:
When a claimant seeks to have his or her suspension lifted, the claimant is
required only to demonstrate that the reasons for the suspension no longer
exist .... Simply stated, the claimant's burden is to show that he or she
remained disabled, and that such disability has manifested itself in a loss of
earning power.
Employer argues that it is only required to show that work is available
when the claimant is unable to perform his pre-injury job, and that since
Claimant was able to perform that job, Employer had no such burden. This
assertion is incorrect ...
We do not believe that there is a viable distinction, for the purposes of
workmen's compensation, between claimants who are under suspension
agreements and capable of returning to their pre-injury jobs, and claimants
who are under suspension agreements and able only to return to a modified
or light-duty job. A presumptive partial disability exists whenever there is
an agreement or an order to suspend compensation.. . . [T]he only way in
which an employer can relieve its liability is by offering suitable work to the
claimant, or by successfully filing a termination petition, in which case the
employer has the burden of proving that the claimant's disability has
ceased. 90
The Fells case was a landmark in its own right for the announce-
ment that a worker's return to his regular work was not relevant in
the burden of proof issue surrounding the job availability issue.
The Economy Decorators case had already laid the groundwork for
the holding in Fells by its announcement of the "presumption,"
but the flat holding that the return to regular work was irrelevant
was truly extraordinary. After all, the return to regular work with-
288. 122 Pa Commw 399, 552 A2d 334 (1988).
289. Fells, 552 A2d at 335.
290. Id at 335-36 (citations omitted).
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out limitations was impressive objective evidence of resolution to
partial disability and would have been, under the prior practice,
conclusive on the issue until the claimant showed a worsening of
his condition-while working, after his layoff, or under some other
circumstance. The Fells rule, which reinforced the notion that the
employer always had to provide a job, even to an objectively recov-
ered worker, truly extended the impression that a Pennsylvania
-employer would be "forever an insurer of job availability to a par-
tially disabled claimant," even one who could do his regular work.
The other grave question surrounding Fells was the inherited
defect of ignoring the Act's provision that reinstatement was not
appropriate if the new loss of earnings was shown not to be caused
by disability related to work. This rather critical point was also
missed in the case of Scobbie v WCAB (Greenville Steel Car
Co.),29' in which the court actually implied that the claimant-who
had been cleared for his regular job but did not actually return to
work because of the plant closing, but had been suspended none-
theless-did not even have the burden of moving forward with a
reinstatement. The court implied instead that the employer was,
presumably, to automatically reinstate the claimant in such
circumstances:
We hold that a claimant is not required to file a petition to modify and
"lift" the suspension to prove that which the authorities have already deter-
mined, that is, that his pre-injury job is no longer available. 2'
As discussed below, the presumption of partial disability has been
retained by the supreme court in modified form. It is submitted as
a general proposition that the pre-Fells cases requiring a showing
of job availability when the claimant is laid off from modified work
remain good law, whereas the Scobbie and Fells cases have been
effectively overruled.
291. 118 Pa Commw 424, 545 A2d 465 (1988).
292. Scobbie, 545 A2d at 467. See also generally Certainteed Corp. v WCAB (Wil-
liams), 126 Pa Commw 311, 559 A2d 971, alloe denied, 524 Pa 612, 569 A2d 1370 (1989)
(rule of Fells applied under same circumstances); Andersen v WCAB (Nat'l Forge Co.), 113
Pa Commw 601, 537 A2d 971 (1988) (Fells applied). See also Rite Aid Corp. v WCAB
(Bupp), 112 Pa Commw 548, 535 A2d 763, 765 (1988) ("claimant need only show that the
work provided by the Employer on which the suspension is based, is no longer available to
Claimant, whereupon total disability payments must be reinstated as of the date of termina-
tion of that employment"); Zimcosky v WCAB (U.S. Steel Corp.), 118 Pa Commw 209, 544
A2d 1106 (1988) (applying general rule in case of plant-wide layoff); Baughman v WCAB
(Laurel Environmental Servs., Inc.), 121 Pa Commw 627, 550 A2d 1051 (1988), aloe denied,




C. Reading the Statute-Retreat from the General Rule
While the majority view of the commonwealth court prior to
Pieper was represented by the Busche/Fells line of cases, two deci-
sions stand out which reveal at least two members of the court rec-
ognizing the Act's prohibition against compensating a worker for
non-work-related disability.
This aspect of the law was specifically recognized in Christopher
v WCAB (Dravo Corp.),29 a filed in 1989. In this case, the claimant
had been injured at work and was on a suspension while working
for a subsequent employer. He was discharged from that position
for "non-performance, bad attitude, and problems with expenses,
and not as a result of physical complaints or inability to physically
perform his work. '294 The referee refused to reinstate benefits, not-
withstanding the renewed loss of earning power, and the common-
wealth court ratified the decision. The court recognized the pre-
sumption formulated in the'cases, but then held that it could be
rebutted with certain evidence, a ruling similar to the pre-Busche/
Scobbie line of cases:
Since a presumption of partial disability exists by virtue of the order to
suspend Claimant's compensation, Claimant need only establish continuing
disability and recurrence of loss of earnings resulting from a work-related
incident.
Substantial evidence of record demonstrates [in this case] that any recur-
rence of loss of earning power suffered by Claimant results from non-work-
related factors, i.e., unsatisfactory efforts and performance at his new posi-
tion, and not from a work-related disability. Because Claimant's poor job
performance triggered his loss of earnings, Employer need not prove contin-
ued available work.
29 5
The scholarly Judge Barry, concurring in the decision, pointed out
that the foregoing declaration was correct in light of the language
of Section 413, noting also that recognition of this principle was a
"departure from our previous case law, '296 i.e., the relatively recent
Busche/Fells line of cases:
[This] is not an unwelcome change. I find support for the majority's state-
ment of the law in section 413(a) of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compen-
sation Act which provides ... that "where compensation has been sus-
pended . . . payments under the agreement or award may be resumed at
293. 124 Pa Commw 562, 556 A2d 544 (1989).
294. Christopher, 556 A2d at 545.
295. Id At 545-46.
296. Id at 546 (Barry concurring).
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any time during the period for which compensation for partial disability is
payable, unless it be shown that the loss in earnings does not result from'
the disability due to injury. "297
This was, of course, a completely correct statement of affairs and
marked the first time since Busche that the commonwealth court
acknowledged the role of the latter clause. It is submitted that the
statute should in the future be given effect as was intended and as
now endorsed by the concurring judge.
A further retreat from the notion that the presumption of partial
disability could only be defeated by a showing of job availability
was evident in York City School Dist. v WCAB (Peyser). 28 In that
case, the claimant had suffered a work-related knee injury and was
working at what was apparently a new job, on a suspension. A year
later he experienced new problems and went off work, seeking rein-
statement. The employer defended against the case by alleging
that the new problems were unrelated and constituted a new in-
jury. The claimant apparently argued that since he went off of
work while on a suspension, his benefits should be automatically
reinstated, but the court in any event rejected such a notion. In-
stead, it permitted the employer to assert an "affirmative defense"
of the sort implied as available from Section 413:
Where a reinstatement petition has been filed following a suspension, the
burden is on an employer, in the nature of an affirmative defense, to
demonstrate that the disability is, in fact, attributable to a new injury for
which a different employer might be liable.
2'9
The permitting of an "affirmative defense" to establish that im-
paired earnings are due to non-work-related causes is, of course, a
far cry from the suggestion in Scobbie that an employer must au-
tomatically reinstate a claimant.300 Plainly, under the better cases
a suspended claimant always has at least the burden of moving
forward after suffering a renewed loss of earning power, at which
time the employer has the opportunity to present- evidence that
the loss of earnings are not from a work impairment. This proposi-
tion is supported now not only by the statute, which should be
authority enough, but by the Christopher and York City cases.
297. Id. See also Zimcosky v WCAB (U.S. Steel Corp.), 118 Pa Commw 209, 544 A2d
1106 (1988) (Crumlish dissenting).
298. 136 Pa Commw 110, 582 A2d 423 (1990).
299. York City School Dist., 582 A2d at 425.
300. See note 292 and accompanying text.
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D. The Supreme Court Speaks: Pieper v Ametek-Thermox
Instruments Div. and the Current Regime
The current regime is at least partly defined by the supreme
court's case of Pieper v Ametek-Thermox Instruments Div.,301 in
which the court adopts in part the "presumption" notion devel-
oped by the commonwealth court, but then apparently rejects the
idea that this is to apply to a worker who has actually returned to
his regular job at the time of or after the suspension.
The claimant in Pieper had returned to work and apparently
signed a supplemental agreement. As found by the supreme court,
his benefits were effectively suspended in that agreement.302 The
claimant returned to his time-of-injury job. After the suspension,
the claimant was laid off and thereupon received unemployment
compensation for the maximum twenty-six week period. He sought
reinstatement on total disability thereafter, alleging that he was
still disabled and that his condition had continued directly from
the earlier, pre-suspension injury. The employer refused any "au-
tomatic reinstatement" and benefits were denied. 3
The case reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court after the
commonwealth court had affirmed the denial of reinstatement in
an unreported opinion. The issue in the case was the nature of the
burden of proof on a claimant who has been on a suspension to
gain entitlement to reinstatement.
The supreme court ultimately held that the claimant was enti-
tled to reinstatement in this particular case. In the course of so
holding, however, the court set forth in precise terms the claim-
ant's burden. In this regard, the court first purported to ratify the
many commonwealth court cases which held that a suspension of
301. 526 Pa 25, 584 A2d 301 (1990).
302. Pieper, 584 A2d at 306. According to the litigants in the case, however, the claim-
ant's benefits were actually terminated by the agreement. Interview with Pamela Coche-
nour, Esquire, September 8, 1991. In fact, in the course of the appeal the claimant acknowl-
edged this fact. Research by this writer likewise indicates that the parties had previously
agreed that the claimant's benefits were terminated prior to the reinstatement attempt, and
the commonwealth court had properly taken this for granted in their decision. The supreme
court's refusal to acquiesce in this crucial, stipulated fact was thus perplexing and frustrat-
ing to the parties. On remand, the commonwealth court filed a decision again insisting that
the worker's benefits had been terminated, but acquiescing in the supreme court's ruling.
Pieper v Ametek-Thermox Instruments Div., 1992 WL 42396 (Pa Commw).
For purposes of the appeal and purposes of precedent, however, the case is properly con-
sidered to have involved a suspension since the court so demanded in the opinion. It may be
that the court specifically wished to set forth new law on the occasion of the appeal and thus
contrived its own facts.
303. See Pieper, 584 A2d at 303.
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compensation created a "presumption" of continuing disability:
In such suspension situations, the causal connection between the original
work-related injury and the disability . . . is presumed . . . [because,
among other reasons,] there is no contention by any party that the liability
of the employer [had] terminated. The only fact established at a suspension
of benefits is that the earning power of a claimant has improved to a point
where benefits are no longer necessary. Since the disability continues to ex-
ist, the liability of the employer has not terminated. Therefore, in these sit-
uations the causal connection between the original work-related injury and
the disability goes unquestioned.
Thereafter, if the economic picture of a claimant changes and he applies
for reinstatement of benefits, he need not re-prove the casual connection
between the original disability and the fact that it was suffered at work per
his original claim, since causation was established at the time of the original
claim.
3 0 4
This language does indeed seem to ratify the "presumption of con-
tinuing disability" formulation generated by the commonwealth
court. A closer analysis, however, demonstrates that the concept is
apparently different. The commonwealth court desired to create a
presumption of true continuing disability in the physical impair-
ment sense, i.e., a rule that although the worker could technically
do his regular job tasks, he still possessed a residual disability that
affected him on an active basis. This rule in turn justified the no-
tion of requiring a virtual automatic reinstatement upon renewed
loss of earnings; since the claimant was presumed still impaired, it
was only right to make the employer immediately have the burden
of showing job availability upon the renewed loss.
The supreme court, on the other hand, makes reference to con-
tinuing disability, but concentrates on a presumption of causal
connection rather than disability in its impairment context. The
distinction is evident in the ultimate formulation set forth by the
court, which does not seem to give the claimant any advantage at
all in terms of a presumption of continuing impairment, instead
putting the burden on the worker to show that disability contin-
ues. The two prong burden of proof on the suspended claimant is
as follows:
[While there is a presumption as to causation,] since many months or
years may pass before the economic condition of a claimant forces him to
apply for reinstatement of benefits, the law requires a claimant to prove
two things in order to show that the reasons for the suspension no longer
exist.
304. Id at 304-05.
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First, he must show that through no fault of his own his earning power is
once again adversely affected by his disability. And second, that the disabil-
ity which gave rise to his original claim, in fact, continues. . . . [B]ecause of
the passage of time, the law does require that he prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that it is the same disability that the law presumes occurred
during his original employment and for which he initially received work-
men's compensation benefits. In otherwords, that his disability has not
ceased during the passage of time.
305
In the particular case at hand, the court examined the evidence
and determined that the claimant had met his burden of proof to
gain reinstatement, having satisfied the two prong test. The court
in this regard studied the claimant's physician's testimony, and de-
termined that it stood for the fact that the worker had a continu-
ing herniated disc syndrome that caused real impairment.306 As
there was impairment (limitations on work activity), the claimant
was thus not fully recovered, and the employer had not shown job
availability30 7 so that the claimant had met his burden of proof.
What is to be said in summary with regard to this now leading
case? Certainly there is no rule of "automatic reinstatement," as
implied in the Scobbie case. The claimant who has been on suspen-
sion plainly has the burden to move forward and satisfy the two
prong burden. If the claimant has lost wages because of his own
fault, he plainly is not entitled to compensation. Job availability
need not be shown with regard to such an individual. If the claim-
ant has lost wages again because of a change in "economic condi-
tion," (i.e., a lay-off), he must secure medical evidence that he still
possesses physical impairment which keeps him from his job or, at
the very least, that he has continued physical disability of some
kind-pathology, residual symptoms, etc. If there is no such show-
ing, he is not entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the fact
that he has been on a suspension.
It is submitted that this latter formulation should apply only to
workers who have returned on a suspension to their original work.
These were the facts of Pieper, although the supreme court did not
explicitly recognize the distinction between the worker who has re-
turned to work on a suspension at modified work as opposed to
regular duty.308
305. Id at 305.
306. Id at 306-08.
307. Id at 308.
308. A worker who has never returned to regular duty in the first place has never




It is submitted that Pieper has effectively overruled, in signifi-
cant part, the Fells and Scobbie cases. A worker who has returned
to his time-of-injury job does have a burden of proof to get back on
compensation upon an economic layoff.
Precisely how Pieper is to be interpreted is undetermined at the
time of this writing. The court's opinion is based on a sound prin-
ciple, but nevertheless leaves many questions unanswered and
lacks the comprehensiveness and thoughtful character of Kachin-
ski. In other words, while the law of what job availability consists
of has been subject to careful scrutiny by the supreme court, such
attention has still not been paid by the supreme court to the issue
of when job availability must be demonstrated.
In lieu of "concrete guidelines" on the latter issue, it is submit-
ted that the present law can summarized as follows. An employer
seeking an initial modification or suspension must always show job
availability.30 9 A claimant who files a claim petition and continues
to be disabled throughout the litigation is entitled to an open-en-
ded award of total disability in lieu of a showing of job availabil-
ity.3 10 A claimant who has returned to modified work on a partial
disability or complete suspension is entitled to reinstatement to to-
tal disability at the time of economic lay off or downturn, in lieu of
a showing of job availability.3 11 A worker, however, who returns to
his original work on a suspension is not entitled to reinstatement
upon economic layoff but must instead prove that he has contin-
ued disability reflected by physical impairment or at least by
residual pathology or symptoms.3 12
An employer need not show job availability where a worker has
lost wages because of his own fault 13 or because of another non-
injury-related discharge from work. 4 An employer need not show
309. Kachinski v WCAB (Vepco Const. Co.), 516 Pa 240, 532 A2d 374 (1987).
310. Barrett v Otis Elevator Co., 431 Pa 446, 246 A2d 668 (1968); Steinle v WCAB, 38
Pa Commw 241, 393 A2d 503 (1978).
311. Busche v WCAB (Townsend & Bottum, Inc.), 77 Pa Commw 469, 466 A2d 278
(1983).
312. Pieper, 556 A2d 544 (1989). The commonwealth court has not been recognizing
this rule with any particular interest. See, for example, Williams v WCAB (AT&T Technol-
ogies, Inc.), Pa Commw , 601 A2d 473 (1991).
313. Pieper, 556 A2d 544 (1989). See also Christopher v WCAB (Dravo Corp.), 124 Pa
Commw 562, 556 A2d 544 (1989); WCAB v John W. Galbreath & Co., 20 Pa Commw 283,
341 A2d 541 (1975); Crain v Small Tube Prods., Inc., 200 Pa Super 426, 188 A2d 766 (1963).
314. Christopher, 556 A2d 544 (1989). It is submitted that the employer need not
demonstrate a case of willful misconduct in such cases. The issue is whether the renewed
loss of earnings is because of disability from the work-related injury. Section 413 of the Act,
77 Pa Stat Ann § 772 (Purdon Supp 1992).
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job availability when the partially-recovered claimant has removed
himself from the job marketplace, such as by going to school full-
time 15 or by retiring with no intention of ever working again.3 16 An
employer probably should show job availability when the claimant
is in jail. 17
Job availability need not be shown when the medical evidence
demonstrates complete recovery without residuals. In other words,
in a successful termination petition, job availability need not be
demonstrated.
It should be noted that, at the time of this writing, there is still
uncertainty in the law of when job availability is to be shown. The
commonwealth court has been particularly reluctant to recognize
the "two-prong" burden articulated by the supreme court in
Pieper relative to workers who have returned to regular work on
suspensions. Instead, it continues to cite its own, pre-Pieper cases,
dismissing wholesale the notion that an employer can avoid show-
ing job availability by pointing to the fact that it was economic
conditions, not physical impairment, that caused the worker's re-
newed loss of earnings .3 1 Attentive commentators agree that there
319is significant dispute on this issue.
E. The Proposed Statute
The Busche/Fells line of cases raised great concerns, as dis-
315. P.P.G. Indus. Inc. v WCAB, 7 Pa Commw 588, 300 A2d 902 (1973).
316. Dugan v WCAB (Fuller Co. of Catasauqua), 131 Pa Commw 218, 569 A2d 1038
(1990). See also McAfee v WCAB (Allegheny Gen. Hosp.), 134 Pa Commw 562, 579 A2d
1363 (1990); Schmidt v WCAB (Fetch), 140 Pa Commw 590, 594 A2d 812 (1991); Patter-
son-Kelly Co. v WCAB (Woodrow), 137 Pa Commw 567, 586 A2d 1043 (1991). The claimant
must be absolutely unequivocal in his resolve never to work again by virtue of retirement
before the requirement of showing job availability is excused. See generally David B. Torrey,
Kachinski and Showing Job Availability: Developments, August 1990-August 1991, Pa
Workmen's Compensation Newsletter at 14-16 (July 1991).
317. See, for example, Brown v WCAB (City of Pittsburgh), 134 Pa Commw 31, 578
A2d 69 (1990), alloc denied, 527 Pa 652, 593 A2d 423 (1991).
318. See, for example, Williams v WCAB (AT&T Technologies, Inc.), Pa Commw
601 A2d 473 (1991) (per Judge Barbieri, "alleged economic reasons and seniority may
not represent excuses- for non-payment of benefits due the Claimant." The claimant had
returned on suspension with restrictions).
319. Remarks of Mr. David S. Hawkins, Ass't Secretary, Workers' Compensation Ap-
peal Board, to the author, November 14, 1991.
That uncertainty exists on this point is reflected in the leading treatise that, in its most
recent edition, does not take a hard position on the interpretation of Pieper. Instead, the
authors simply insist that the Busche/Fells line of cases "must be interpreted in light of
... Pieper .. " S. Siegel, et al, Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Practice and Pro-
cedure 121 (Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 1992).
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cussed above, that the employer's workmen's compensation re-
sponsibility was being converted into a program to make the em-
ployer "forever an insurer of job availability." This worry was real,
at least until Pieper, because cases such as Fells held that the
claimant who returns to his time-of-injury job on a suspension was
entitled to a virtual automatic reinstatement to compensation
when economic conditions change and layoffs follow. This would be
the case even if the claimant had been working free of pain or im-
pairment at his old job for many years.
This concern has generated the offer of proposed new legislation,
perhaps motivated also by frustration that the courts refused to
pay attention to the current statute. Other circumstances resulting
in renewed loss of earnings are treated in the legislation as well.
The proposed amendment to Section 306 of the Act 320 provides,
in pertinent part:
(a) . . . Nothing in this act shall require payment of compensation for
any period during which the employe is incarcerated, nor for any period
during which the employe is enrolled in any educational institution, without
the written approval of the insurer or self-insured...
(b)(1) For disability partial in character, connected with and arising out
of the compensable injury or disease [the claimant shall receive two-thirds
of the difference between the claimant's average weekly wage at time of in-
jury and the earning power of the claimant thereafter] ...
(2) A reduction of the employe's post injury earnings attributable to any
of the following extraneous and economy-driven factors shall not be consid-
ered, standing alone, a loss of earning power arising out of or connected
with the employe's injury or disease: across-the-board wage reductions im-
pacting on the employe and his coworkers; a layoff due to lack of work with
the employer; plant closures; reduction of available work hours; a reduction
of overtime available to the employe and his coworkers; a voluntary decision
to change jobs or area of residence; retirement; other economic develop-
ments which serve to reduce the amount of work available to the employe
and his coworkers.
(3) In the event of a layoff or plant closure, the employe receiving partial
disability benefits shall continue to receive said benefits with the benefits to
be an average of the partial disability payments he received over the fifty-
two weeks prior to the layoff or plant closure. These payments shall con-
tinue for the remainder of the five hundred week maximum period during
which partial disability benefits may be received, or until, if ever, a change
occurs in his disability status.
[T]he employe receiving partial disability benefits at the time of the lay-
off or plant closure, as well as employe whose benefits had been suspended
upon their return to work, are eligible to receive a resumption of temporary
total disability benefits if they can show, by clear and convincing evidence,
320. 77 Pa Stat Ann § 542 et seq.
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the continued presence of residual disability attributable to their work in-
jury or disease serving to place them at a substantial disadvantage relative
to their cowokers in securing new work elsewhere within a geographic area
reasonably proximate to their residence ... 321
The reader who has traced the development of the Busche/Fells
line of cases will readily perceive that this proposed legislation is
advanced in direct reaction to the growth of the doctrine which
those cases established, i.e., the seemingly permanent requirement
to show the actual availability of employment, even to fully em-
ployed workers who happen to be on suspensions.
It is submitted that the legislation above, or in substantially sim-
ilar form, is necessary to correct those unfortunate cases. An analy-
sis of the cases demonstrates that they were generated in unfortu-
nate denial of the existence of Section 413 of the Act and the
fundamental principle that workmens' compensation is not meant
to compensate for unemployment.322 The current regime has laud-
able aspects, but legislation is necessary to ensure that the Penn-
sylvania employer is not, to repeat the pervasive motto of the
cases, "forever [the] insurer of job availability to a partially dis-
abled claimant . .. .
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE LAW OF JOB AVAILABILITY AND
VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
A. Policies in the Law of Job Availability
Determining precisely what was the driving force behind the
commonwealth court's development of the present law of job avail-
ability and partial disability is difficult. The court set forth no dis-
cernible policy analysis along the remarkable road from requiring
employers merely to demonstrate partial medical recovery to gain
an order of partial disability, to requiring actual job offers within
prescribed limitations on a virtual lifetime basis. Instead, the
change was effected essentially by interpretation of precedent
which was both creative and tenuous.
There are, however, discernable hints as to the original inten-
tions in this regard. First, it is submitted that Judge Barbieri, ar-
chitect of the current regime and the court's unquestioned author-
ity on compensation matters, was dissatisfied with the traditional
321. Amendments to House Bill No 2140 (Printer's No 2853), amending the Pennsyl-
vania Workmen's Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, Pub L 736, No 338, as amended
(proposed by State Sen. Roger A. Madigan).
322. See note 42 and accompanying text.
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practice and rule, which permitted a showing of job availability in
a virtual vacuum without actual communication of the existence of
such work to the involved worker. He thus delivered, on a virtual
ex cathreda basis, the rule that a "job open" was not necessarily a
"job available" under the leading supreme court cases-Unora and
Petrone-and demanded that a job should only be considered
available if its existence was fully communicated to the worker at a
time he or she could technically perform its tasks, at a time when
the job was actually open.32 3 It is probable that the belief was that
only with this type of showing should the employer be considered
to have shown on a realistic basis that the individual was actually
capable of real work. It is also likely that the court thought inequi-
table the fact that some employers, thought more responsible than
others, already provided modified work to gain entitlement to par-
tial disability, while others, especially insurance companies, could
legitimately seek under the traditional practice the expedient
method of reducing benefits merely by having a doctor testify as to
the claimant's theoretical ability to do some level of work. The in-
equity was thus remedied by imposing in every case the burden of
showing the availability of an actual job.
While the architect of the current regime was Judge Barbieri,
the supreme court in Kachinski took on the job of explicitly set-
ting forth a basis for the change in the law. The court, in this re-
gard, set forth what was probably latent in the commonwealth
court decisions:
[The employer's responsibility to a worker under workmen's compensation,]
though not without its limits, requires at a minimum some effort on the
part of the employer to make the injured employee whole. To impose on the
injured party the duty to find alternative work under pain of foregoing the
compensation to which he has become entitled is. . . a concept far removed
from the salutary purpose of workmen's compensation to provide relief due
to injuries caused in the workplace. ...
Therefore, we adopt the Commonwealth Court's interpretation of "availa-
ble" as requiring a showing of actual job availability.
One injured at work, stranded on partial disability, deserves more than a
generic list describing where he might find some suitable work.
324
The Kachinski court thus conceptualized the employer's respon-
sibility of finding the claimant a suitable job as part of the essen-
323. King Fifth Wheel Co. v WCAB (Rhodes), 79 Pa Commw 300, 468 A2d 1211
(1983).
324. Kachinski, 532 A2d at 379, 380.
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tial remedy of workmen's compensation. Payment of lost wages
and medical expenses, under this view, is not the beginning and
end of compensation benefits; instead, the claimant is to be pro-
vided with the rudimentary vocational rehabilitation "service" of
being either directed to or placed in real work to restore wage loss
and a productive life.
Because this is the evident policy and intent of the Kachinski
court, the subsequent blossoming of more detailed requirements as
to the showing of job availability can be viewed as somewhat justi-
fied, if perhaps hypertechnical and vexing at times. The cases have
further defined for employers precisely what must be done to prop-
erly direct injured workers back to work. The court has, plain and
simple, created a judge-made plan of vocational placement which
will have many details and nuances. The outlet for the details of
the plan will be in the court cases.
As discussed below, it is submitted that this phenomenon is an
admirable development, given the omission from the Pennsylvania
Act of any entitlement to vocational rehabilitation services and the
concurrent lack of any administrative authority over the rehabili-
tation process.
No such laudatory words can be afforded to the case law devel-
opment which has made the employer a virtual insurer for all
times of job availability. The rule of Busche and Smith, discussed
above, 25 holding that a worker is entitled to total disability when
laid off from modified work, is reasonable and sensible. In such
instances the claimant has plainly not recovered, and the responsi-
bility of providing a worker with such objective disability yet an-
other actual job is just and consistent with the Kachinski court
policy.
The rule of Economy Decorators and Fells, however, demanding
that the employer indefinitely show job availability to a worker
who has returned to work at his time-of-injury job, though on a
suspension,326 takes the remedy of job availability entirely too far.
As demonstrated above, the rule developed in hostility to both the
policy of workmen's compensation only to cover work-related disa-
bility, and Section 413 of the Act.
The extension of the job availability requirement in this context
was also effected on a virtual ex cathedra basis, with the court
flatly declaring that there was no difference, for workmen's com-
325. See notes 271-79 and accompanying text.
326. See notes 280-92 and accompanying text.
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pensation purposes, between a worker who has returned to modi-
fied work on a suspension and one who has returned to regular
work on a suspension.32 7 It is respectfully submitted that such a
statement is crucially inaccurate, because such a worker by virtue
of the fact of his work generates objective evidence of such lack of
impairment that he should be able to perform the normal job tasks
of his trade or practice. There is no just reason to afford him a
presumption of impairment or continuing pathological condition
that would in turn justify an automatic reinstatement of benefits.
This fact was, of course, ultimately recognized in the supreme
court's Pieper decision.32 s
The point of this criticism is that, unlike the principled, policy-
driven heritage of Kachinski, the Economy Decorators/Fells rule
grew out of an unfortunate failure to be attentive to an extant stat-
ute and imposed on employers a liability that was neither intended
by the legislature nor anticipated by employers. As discussed
above, the latter rule has apparently been overthrown by the
Pieper decision, but how the commonwealth court will interpret
that opinion remains to be seen.
B. Vocational Rehabilitation in Pennsylvania
As discussed at the outset of this article, Pennsylvania has no
vocational rehabilitation provision in its workmen's compensation
statute . 29 There is, accordingly, no requirement that an employer
provide vocational rehabilitation services, no right of a claimant to
seek out vocational rehabilitation services, no power of the referee
to order such a program, and, of course, no unit of the Bureau of
Workers' Compensation or Department of Labor and Industry to
either direct or monitor such activities.3 It is thus perhaps a sur-
327. Fells v WCAB (Caterpillar Tractor Co.), 122 Pa Commw 399, 552 A2d 334
(1988).
328. See note 305 and accompanying text.
329. See note 1. See also generally Irvin Stander, Guide to Pennsylvania Workers'
Compensation 310 (Pa L J, Phila., Pa 1979) ("It is obvious that Pennsylvania lags far be-
hind many other states in providing any kind of meaningful rehabilitation services in work-
ers' compensation, even on a voluntary basis").
330. As Referee Stander pointed out in 1979, there is a provision of the Act which
directs that the Bureau "shall furnish to persons adversely affected by occupational disease
appropriate counseling services, vocational rehabilitation services, and other supportive ser-
vices designed to promote employability to the extent that such services are available and
practical." Section 435 of the Act, 77 Pa Stat Ann § 991(e) (Purdon 1992). See Stander,
Guide to Pennsylvania Workers Compensation at 310 (cited in note 329). As he pointed out
at that time, however, the statute is limited only to diseases and, in any event, has not been
implemented with any vigor. That remains the case in 1992. The reason for this probably
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prise to posit that "vocational rehabilitation" under the Pennsyl-
vania Act is a crucial element of the law and that private compa-
nies providing such services are part of a thriving business
enterprise and provide a mandatory service to countless employers
and insurance companies.
The answer, of course, is that the Kachinski requirements, as
further extended through the life of many claims through the
Busche/Fells line of cases, form the basis for a rudimentary voca-
tional rehabilitation program. It stands to reason that, if the em-
ployer or insurer in Pennsylvania is only entitled to reduce or sus-
pend benefits to an injured worker by showing an available job, the
process of job finding will be undertaken, by necessity, with vigor
and frequency.
The cynic will respond that merely pointing a worker to jobs
does not constitute "vocational rehabilitation," but in fact most
commentators consider that, in the workmen's compensation con-
text, such a process does in fact count as rehabilitation. 331 This is
not to say that other more aggressive or exotic methods of rehabili-
tation, such as counseling, retraining, and schooling, are not in cer-
tain cases reasonable and appropriate and also constitute voca-
tional rehabilitation, but it does legitimize use of the term in the
lies in its self-limiting final clause, which seems to remove from the provision any
mandatory character.
The Commonwealth also has a Bureau of Vocational Rehabilitation (BVR), founded pur-
suant to federal mandate. As referee Stander also pointed out in 1979, "its liaison with
workers' compensation cases has been a 'sometimes' thing." This likewise remains the case,
and there is no coordination whatsoever between that agency and the Bureau of Workers'
Compensation, nor is there any mandate that such coordination be undertaken. The BVR
does not have active job placement services immediately available to partially disabled
workers. (In Indiana, there is such coordination. See generally Vance, 24 Valparaiso L Rey
at 272-81, 302-04 (cited in note 1). Vance is critical of such an arrangement and favors a
comprehensive program under the auspices of the workmen's compensation administration.
As a result, employers are on their own to turn to private rehabilitation companies if they
wish to undertake voluntary vocational rehabilitation and/or vocational placement activities.
A counselor doing a careful and industrious job can turn to the BVR to secure approval for
state and federal programs that encourage placement of injured workers. Interview with
Colleen Miller, CRC, East Pittsburgh, Pa, (Mar 6, 1992).
331. See, for example, Comment, Vocational Rehabilitation in the Workers' Compen-
sation System, 33 Ark L Rev 723, 728 (1980). See also J. Gregory Householter & Arnold G.
Rubin, An Overview of Industrial Vocational Rehabilitation Statutes and Approaches, 74
Ill Bar J 342, 344 (Mar 1986) (stating that the "stated goal of vocational rehabilitation
should be to return the injured employee to the same economic condition as prior to the
accident"). See also Vance, 24 Valparaiso L Rev at 282 (cited in note 1) (noting that the goal
of vocational rehabilitation in workmen's compensation is "prompt return of the worker to
gainful employment" as opposed to the broader mandate of the federal/state program man-




In any event, Pennsylvania thus possesses a basic, judge-created
form of vocational rehabilitation by requiring a showing of job
availability on a nearly continuous basis. In addition, of course, an
employer is always free to voluntarily provide more extensive ser-
vices such as counseling, retraining and schooling, though a claim-
ant's refusal to undertake such efforts will probably not result in a
forfeiture of benefits.3 32 A mutually agreeable commutation or set-
tlement of benefits can also be undertaken for the claimant to plan
for his own retraining or new business venture. If found to be un-
dertaken seriously by the Board or referee, such a proposal could
be and is, at times, approved. 3
It should be noted, of course, that this basic vocational rehabili-
tation effort is often thought mandatory under the Pennsylvania
Act because total disability is potentially payable for the life of the
claimant,3 34 and there is no purely medical determination of partial
disability which would permit an employer to reduce its liability. A
real job must always be shown in conjunction with the clearance
for work.
Whether this judge-made system of "leveraged rehabilitation" is
the best system available is subject to serious question. An analysis
of the approach of other states-normally found in a statute, not
court decisions-suggests that a more satisfying approach to voca-
tional rehabilitation should be considered.
C. The Philosophy of Vocational Rehabilitation and the Ap-
proach of Other Jurisdictions-In Brief
The vast majority of states, regardless of how compensation for
total disability and partial disability is paid, possess statutory pro-
332. Prior to the Kachinski regime the commonwealth court held that a workmen's
compensation claimant "cannot be compelled to participate in a vocational rehabilitation
program," but also acknowledged that such a worker's "refusal or failure to do so will not
prejudice the employer." Holmes v WCAB (Pisani Bros., Inc.), 86 Pa Commw 543, 485 A2d
874, 876 (1984). It is conceivable that this holding, which is not inconsistent with Kachinski,
could be used as a basis for an argument that an injured worker who refuses to engage in
retraining or further education, and thus precludes any hope of placement, is subject to
suspension of benefits during the period of refusal. Such an argument would have to be
supported by expert vocational testimony that, had the claimant cooperated, employment
could be secured for the claimant.
333. Compare John Crawford, Vocational Rehabilitation for the Industrially Injured
Worker, 28 U Fla L Rev 101, 106 (1975).
334. Section 306(a) of the Act, 77 Pa Stat Ann § 511 (Purdon 1992) (compensation is
payable "for the duration of total disability").
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visions governing a worker's right to vocational rehabilitation.3 35
These states typically require that the bureau of compensation or
other administrative office either initiate and/or monitor the
process.3 36
In certain states the process is truly vital to the rights of the
worker. In many other jurisdictions, after all, the rule survives that
an employer can reduce liability with regard to a partially recov-
ered worker without showing "job availability. 3 3 7 Such workers
are often reduced to a benefit rate that could not possibly support
the worker or his or her family, and the need for formal rehabilita-
tion, with the claimant intimately involved in the process, is a vital
aspect of the rights of a truly impaired worker who wants to be
employed.
The legal literature is ripe with analysis of and recommendations
concerning vocational rehabilitation in the context of workmen's
compensation, and attentiveness to this commentary is crucial to
the understanding of the structure of the law of other states.
As all commentators acknowledge, the growth in vocational reha-
bilitation statutes was spawned in significant part by the findings
and recommendations of the National Commission on State Work-
men's Compensation Laws (hereinafter "the Commission") in its
335. See US Chamber of Commerce, 1991 Analysis of Workers Compensation Laws at
28-29 (US Chamber of Commerce, 1991) (listing rehabilitation provisions and benefits of all
states in tabular form). See also DeCarlo & Minkowitz, Workers Compensation Insurance
Law and Practice at 242 et seq (cited in note 6) (listing rehabilitation provisions and bene-
fits of all states in tabular form); Croft, 3 Alaska L Rev at 94 et seq (cited in note 1) (listing
rehabilitation provisions and benefits of all states in tabular form).
336. See DeCarlo & Minkowitz, Workers Compensation Insurance Law and Practice
at 242 et seq (cited in note 6) (listing whether each state has a vocational unit in compensa-
tion bureau).
337. In New York, for example, the determination of whether a worker is totally or
partially disabled is usually a purely medical question, not one controlled by an analysis of
his "industrial disability." As Minkowitz points out in his commentary to the involved pro-
vision, "If an employee [under the precedents] was partially medically disabled but unable
to work, a partial award was [nevertheless] made." Martin Minkowitz, Practice Commenta-
ries, Workers' Compensation Law § 15 at 16 (McKinney, Supp 1992) This rule, as they
point out, may be on the wane in that state. See Kowalchyk v Wade Lupe Const. Co., 151
A2d 927, 543 NYS2d 200 (1989) (claimant may be entitled to total disability when he is
"totally industrially disabled," even though not "totally medically disabled"). See
Minkowitz, Practice Commentaries, Workers' Compensation Law § 15 at 16 (cited within
this note).
In Maryland, the effects of injury on the individual claimant's vocational prospects is
taken into consideration in the determination of total or partial disability, but a showing of
actual job availability is not required. See generally Richard Gilbert & Robert L. Hum-




1972 report."3 8 The Commission, of course, found deficiencies in
several areas, and vocational rehabilitation did not escape the at-
tention of the analysts. Although several states already had voca-
tional rehabilitation included in their statutes, the Commission
found that "vocational guidance and instruction services are spotty
and placement services for rehabilitated workers are generally in-
adequate."339 The Commission likewise noted that "in most states
the needed liaison with available agencies is poorly developed or
the number of suitable agencies is limited."34 The Commission
recommended in general that the agency responsible for the work-
men's compensation program undertake vocational rehabilitation
responsibilities:
We recommend that the medical-rehabilitation division be given the specific
responsibility of assuring that every worker who could benefit from voca-
tional rehabilitation services be offered those services.
3 41
We also recommend that the employer pay all costs of vocational rehabilita-
tion necessary to return a worker to suitable employment and authorized by
the workmen's compensation agency."4 2
The philosophy driving the view that vocational rehabilitation is
a critical element of the workmen's compensation remedy is evi-
dent from a basic Pennsylvania source-the Kachinski case. Re-
storing the claimant to productive employment, in the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court's view, is an obligation of the employer in
making the claimant whole after the industrial injury for which the
employer is responsible. 4 s
This philosophy is stated eloquently and with some elaboration
by Larson in his treatise:
The conviction is gradually gaining ground that the compensation job is not
done when the immediate wound has been dressed and healed. There re-
mains the task of restoring the man himself to the maximum usefulness
that he can attain under his physical impairment.
As a matter of underlying philosophy, it is [thus] not difficult to demon-
strate that rehabilitation is properly an inherent part of the workmen's
338. Report of the National Comm'n on State Workmen's Compensation Laws (US
GPO, 1972).
339. Id at 20.
340. Id at 78.
341. Id at 82, Recommendation 4.7.
342. Id at 82, Recommendation 4.8. An excellent summarization of and comment on
the National Commission recommendations, and those of other advisory entities, in the con-
text of vocational rehabilitation is found in Vance, 24 Valparaiso L Rev at 263-69 (cited in
note 1). See also Croft, 3 Alaska L Rev at 58-59, 62 (cited in note 1); Stander, Guide to
Pennsylvania Workmens' Compensation at 304-10 (cited in note 329).
343. See notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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compensation system's function . . . . Even as a purely legal concept, one
could put the matter this way: Restitution is the proper remedy when
money damages will not restore something that is unique. How much
clearer is it that, when the loss is the loss of use of a limb rather than of
mere chattels, restitution is the most appropriate remedy.34 '
As pointed out in the exhaustive study by Croft, "state legisla-
tures and courts differ greatly in their expressions of the philoso-
phy behind, and purpose of, workers' compensation vocational re-
habilitation."I '45 In addition to the restitution notion expressed by
Larson, 46 other ascertainable "underlying concepts" of the reha-
bilitation effort in compensation include: (1) the notion that voca-
tional rehabilitation preserves the "intrisic dignity of man, his feel-
ing of self-worth and his right to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness, s3 7 (2) the tenet that restoration of the worker to an
actual job is a purpose of workmen's compensation,3 8 and (3) the
"efficiency" consideration, i.e., the fact that "well-managed, cost-
effective rehabilitation will enable many disabled workers to return
to productive jobs and thus reduce compensation costs. 3 49
Precisely how far the vocational rehabilitation remedy extends is
another question. The most ambitious view of the extent of voca-
tional rehabilitation is expressed by one commentator as being the
restoration of handicapped workers to "'the fullest physical, social,
vocational, and economic usefulness of which they are capable,' a
goal commonly accepted as the ultimate aim of all rehabilitation
344. Larson, 3 Workmen's Compensation § 61.20 at 10-912 (cited in note 46).
345. Croft, 3 Alaska L Rev at 59 (cited in note 1).
346. Id at 62, citing Note, Eligibility for Vocational Rehabilitation under the Maine
Workers' Compensation Act: Troubling New Standard, 32 Me L Rev 237 (1980).
347. Croft, 3 Alaska L Rev at 59-60 (cited in note 1), quoting Z. Jackson, Presentation
of Preliminary Findings of a Comprehensive Study of Vocational Rehabilitation in the
Alaska Workers' Compensation Program 4 (1982).
348. Croft, 3 Alaska L Rev at 60 (cited in note 1). For this proposition the author
quotes the policy statement of the Minnesota workmen's compensation statute's vocational
rehabilitation provisions:
Rehabilitation is intended to restore the injured employee, through physical and vo-
cational rehabilitation, so the employee may return to a job related to the employee's
former employment or to a job in another work area which provides an economic
status as close as possible to that the employee would have enjoyed without disabil-
ity. Rehabilitation to a job with a higher economic status than would have occurred
without disability is permitted if it can be demonstrated that this rehabilitation is
necessary to increase the likelihood of reemployment. Economic status is to be mea-
sured not only by opportunity for immediate income but also by opportunity for fu-
ture income.
Id, quoting Minn Stat Ann § 176.102(1) (West Supp 1985).




Typically, however, it is acknowledged that the extent of voca-
tional rehabilitation in the case of an injured worker is going to be,
and is, appropriately limited. The vocational rehabilitation in the
compensation system of an injured worker, normally a mature
adult, is manifestly different, for example, from the efforts to be
undertaken with regard to a catastrophically injured child or ado-
lescent. It is also different from those to be rehabilitated within
the requirements of the federal/state vocational rehabilitation pro-
gram, which seeks to "maximize the human potential."3 51
Perhaps in recognition of this fact, at least one state has devel-
oped a hierarchy of sorts with regard to rehabilitation efforts, with
return of the worker to his old job, with modification, as the most
desired goal, and with actual retraining in a different field used
"only as a last resort. 3 5 2 This is not an uncommon sentiment, even
among great advocates of vocational rehabilitation in the work-
men's compensation context. 3
The variety among the states in terms of vocational rehabilita-
tion statutes is considerable. 54 As the author of one admirable sur-
vey asserts, "No two states provide identical vocational rehabilita-
tion programs for their injured workers . . . .Also, definitions of
terms are not uniform across the fifty states. 35 Both the quoted
writer and Croft, cited earlier, have nevertheless sought to classify
the various state vocational rehabilitation statutes in their near
epic works on this issue.
3 56
Two states contiguous to Pennsylvania stand as typical exam-
ples. New York, for example, possesses a non-mandatory system of
vocational rehabilitation and has a vocational reliabilitation unit in
its workers' compensation bureau. 57 Employers and carriers pay
monies into a state Vocational Rehabilitation Fund, which pays re-
habilitation costs except for temporary total disability received in
350. Crawford, 28 U Fla L Rev at 103 (cited in note 333).
351. Vance, 24 Valparaiso L Rev at 282 (cited in note 1).
352. Comment, 33 Ark L Rev at 728-29 (cited in note 331).
353. See, for example, Vance, 24 Valparaiso L Rev at 282 (cited in note 1).
354. See, for example, Householter & Rubin, 74 Ill Bar J 342 (cited in note 331) (sur-
veying and classifying various approaches); Croft, 3 Alaska L Rev at 205-80 (cited in note 1)
(surveying and classifying various approaches).
355. Vance, 24 Valparaiso L Rev at 286 (cited in note 1).
356. See id at 2§6-89; Croft, 3 Alaska L Rev at 66-92 (cited in note 1).
357. See DeCarlo & Minkowitz, Workers' Compensation Insurance and Law Practice
at 238-39 (cited in note 6).
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the course of the process s.3 5  A weekly maintenance is paid during
the process.
35 9
Maryland maintains a mandatory vocational rehabilitation stat-
ute that has been the subject recently of new amendments. °
Under the amended Maryland law, an injured employee is "enti-
tled to vocational rehabilitation services" when he is "disabled
from performing work for which [he was] previously qualified as
the result of an accidental personal injury or occupational disease
.... "361 There is no absolute rule as to "when vocational services
should be requested or implemented. '" 362 However, after a claimant
has been on temporary total disability for six months, the em-
ployer is obliged to file a form with the Commission informing it of
that fact and indicating whether vocational rehabilitation has been
initiated and its status.
3 63
When the Workers' Compensation Commission becomes in-
volved, either on its own or at the prompting of one or both364 of
the parties, it has affirmative duties and, under the law shall:
(1) refer a covered employee who is entitled to vocational rehabilitation ser-
vices ... to an appropriate vocational rehabilitation provider; and
(2) obtain from the provider a vocational rehabilitation plan that includes
(i) a vocational assessment; and
(ii) recommendations for vocational rehabilitation services reasonably
necessary to return the injured employee to suitable gainful
employment.3 65
After this is secured and shared with the claimant and employer,
enforcement mechanisms are triggered. The law provides, in this
358. Workers' Compensation Law, § 15(9) (McKinney Supp 1992).
359. Id. See generally DeCarlo & Minkowitz, Workers' Compensation Insurance and
Law Practice at 238-39 (cited in note 6).
360. Md Ann Code, LE §§ 9-670 - 9-677 (Michie Replacement Volume 1991).
361. Id at § 9-672(a).
362. Gilbert & Humphreys, Maryland Workers' Compensation Handbook at 13 (cited
in note 338).
363. Md Ann Code, LE § 9-675(a).
364. Gilbert & Humphreys, Maryland Workers' Compensation Handbook at 19-20
(cited in note 337):
Although not specified by the Act, the parties may (and indeed are encouraged) to
reach a stipulated agreement concerning a rehabilitation plan. The plan is then sent
to the Commission's Rehabilitation Division with a request that the plan form the
basis of an order. The Commission's Rehabilitation personnel review the sufficiency
of the plan and communicate with the parties regarding any necessary changes or
additions. The Rehabilitation Division then presents the plan to the Commission
with a recommendation for disposition and an order is issued shortly thereafter.
Id.




(d) Hearing-(1) Within 15 days after the day of written notification by the
Commission of the contents of the vocational rehabilitation plan, any party
in interest may request a hearing to contest the plan.
(2) At the hearing, the parties may present additional evidence as
necessary.
(3) After the hearing, the Commission shall:
(i) wholly or partly accept the vocational rehabilitation plan; and
(ii) pass an appropriate order about vocational rehabilitation of the cov-
ered employee.366
Definitions exist to guide vocational rehabilitation efforts once
the plan is in place. "Suitable gainful employment" is defined as
"employment, including self-employment, that restores the dis-
abled covered employee, to the extent possible, to the level of sup-
port at the time the disability occurred.1167 The term is further
defined by requiring that "the qualifications, interests, incentives
[and] predisability earnings," among other things, be considered in
the determination of whether such employment is available.368
"Vocational Rehabilitation Services" are defined to include vir-
tually everything conceivable, including assessments, evaluation,
counseling, and job development and placement.3 69 In the course of
receiving such services, for which the employer is, of course, re-
sponsible, the claimant is entitled to continue to receive temporary
total disability.170 Further, the worker is entitled to maintenance
payments and transportation costs if undertaking rehabilitation
away from the area of his or her residence.3 71 Reports are to be
submitted to the Commission in the course of the rehabilitation
effort, which, when consisting of training, is not to exceed twenty-
four months.372  Refusal by the claimant to take part puts the
claimant at risk of forfeiting benefits for the period of the
refusal.3
An analysis of the Maryland law indicates that it presents a
seemingly workable method that is probably superior to the court-
created rudimentary law of job availability existing in Pennsylva-
nia. On a fundamental level, because the law is based on statute it
366. Id at § 9-673(d).
367. Id at § 9-670(b).
368. Id at § 9-673(b).
369. Id at § 9-670(d).
370. Id at § 9-674(b)(1).
371. Id at § 9-674(c).
372. Id at §§ 9-675, 9-672.
373. Id at § 9-674(b)(2).
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is less likely to be significantly altered by judicial activism, whim
or unintended error. Fewer court precedents being generated is
likely to reduce litigation and appeals. Further, the Maryland law
gives the claimant some control over the rehabilitation effort,
something Pennsylvania workers currently do not possess, being
dependent on the interest of the employer or carrier, which holds
complete control over the process. For these reasons, among
others, the Maryland law may be looked to as a potential model for
a Pennsylvania statute on vocational rehabilitation.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to accomplish three things. First, the au-
thor has sought to trace the history of the judge-made law of job
availability to its roots to better understand the development and
source of the current law. This effort has hopefully conveyed what
the author perceives as a true phenomenon-the creation of a
practical, rule-intensive, rudimentary form of vocational rehabilita-
tion by the courts based upon creative use of precedent and reli-
ance upon decades-old abstract principle. While the "job availabil-
ity" requirement has been extended too far-to require that the
Pennsylvania employer become a virtual insurer of employment in
perpetuity to an injured worker-there can be no question but that
the creation of the Kachinski regime was motivated by the most
humane of motives.
Second, the author has sought to set forth the blackletter law of
the current regime. As asserted at the outset, it is submitted that
without some working familiarity with the leading cases and back-
ground of the judicially created rules, the participant in the work-
ers' compensation system will not be able to assess reliably the
rights and remedies of both employer and worker in the context of
partial disability and vocational rehabilitation. Hopefully, this arti-
cle will provide a basis for such working familiarity.
Third, this article has raised the issue of a probable need in
Pennsylvania for a vocational rehabilitation statute. The issue it-
self can only be resolved after further study, with particular em-
phasis on how provisions such as those of Maryland-a modern,
reasonable and balanced law-would operate in the context of the
Pennsylvania workmen's compensation system, which has its own
peculiar heritage and personality.
Plainly, the imposition of such a law by itself would be inappro-
priate without a change in the current level of, and time limits on,
benefit entitlement. Some mechanism must exist in terms of bene-
Vol. 30:515608
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fit reduction to make the typical Pennsylvania claimant, blessed
with total disability until the employer places him in a job, inter-
ested in aggressive rehabilitation efforts available under a statu-
tory plan. In Maryland, significantly, such leverage exists since the
employer is entitled to an order reducing or eliminating benefits
when the worker has reached the point of "maximum medical im-
provement. 3 7 4 When such reduction occurs and the claimant is
truly disabled, it will likely be the claimant who then becomes con-
cerned with his own rehabilitation.
It is not difficult to posit, in any event, that the state of voca-
tional rehabilitation under the Pennsylvania Act is not what it
could be. As discussed at the outset, the fact that the law is found
exclusively in the court cases makes the rules governing partial dis-
ability and vocational rehabilitation virtually inaccessible to em-
ployers and employees for whom the workers' compensation laws
were enacted.3 75 As also asserted at the outset, the absence of any
codification of at least the basics is inappropriate in the field of
workers' compensation, in which a pervasive goal has been to mini-
mize court battles and the excessive involvement of lawyers. The
fact that the rules and nuances are found in the court-created pro-
gram and must become mastered by lawyers, rehabilitation coun-
selors and job finders results in the misdirection of valuable dollars
away from rehabilitation and toward these service providers.
The court-created program has also resulted in a system where
vocational rehabilitation is completely controlled by the employer
and insurance carrier. Of course, this is not entirely unjust, since it
is the employer who must pay the costs of rehabilitation. Still, the
distrust which has been generated because of this phenomenon,
and the fact that the rehabilitation service providers report di-
rectly and exclusively to the employer, is hard to understate. The
typical Pennsylvania claimant is advised that the rehabilitation
374. See Gilbert & Humphries, Maryland Workers' Compensation Handbook at 16
(cited in note 337); interview with Paul C. Sullivan, Esquire, Cumberland, Maryland (Apr 3,
1992).
375. See notes 5 to 6 and accompanying text. This writer once had an injured worker
as a client who had been a union worker for many years. After his injury, many months of
physical therapy, and partial recovery, he began to receive job referrals from a counselor.
Some of the referrals were only questionably appropriate from a vocational point of view,
and the worker found most of them degrading or menial. This writer's advice that he never-
thless apply and be interested was often met with resistance, notwithstanding the explana-
tion that this was what the myriad court precedents probably demanded. He finally de-
manded to see "the statute or regulations, right from the law, that says I have to go through
all of this."
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counselor is a mere "spy," and claimants' counsel seek out poten-
tial clients by cynically inquiring in advertisements whether the
worker "has been "contacted by 'rehabilitation'? 3 76 as if such con-
tact signalled imminent danger.
The union-sponsored handbook Injured on the Job377 reveals in
all its glory the distrust and cynicism existing under the current
regime:
Employers frequently hire "vocational rehabilitation services" to testify
against workers that there are jobs available to the worker within the re-
strictions imposed by the work-related injury. The process usually begins
with the "counselor" interviewing the worker, accompanying the worker to
physical examinations, and then referring to the worker a list of jobs. Do
not be coerced by the counselors' "charm" or "pushy tactics."
You do not have to meet with, or be interviewed by, either a rehabilita-
tion nurse or a job placement service. You should remember that the ser-
vice is being paid by the company to cut off Workers' Compensation.378
The cynicism expressed in the foregoing quote is perhaps ex-
treme and not justified in many cases. Nevertheless, there is no
doubt but that the current regime has generated such feelings and
attitudes toward the system. Creation of a balanced, comprehen-
sive statutory system which makes the claimant a player in voca-
tional rehabilitation is likely to (1) eliminate this acute cynicism,379
(2) extinguish the never-ending mushrooming of court precedents
on job availability, (3) reduce litigation, and (4) bring Pennsylva-
nia into the fold of the vast majority of states that long ago en-
acted legislation to govern the process.
376. Such an advertisement appeared, for example, in the advertising vehicle called
the "Pennysaver" (Carnegie-Bridgeville ed) on February 10, 1992, at page 13, and was
placed by the leading firm for injured workers in the Pittsburgh area. It provides in full:
WORK INJURY? CONTACTED by "Rehabilitation"? Workers Compensation re-
ducing your benefits?
Free discussion - Attorney [ ....
Pennysaver 13 (Carnegie-Bridgeville ed, Feb 10, 1992). While such an advertisement is un-
fortunate, the current system has generated such distrust of the process that it is hardly a
surprise.
377. Cited in note 242.
378. Id at 105-06.
379. In the Maryland system there seems to be less distrust of the rehabilitation pro-
cess and rehabilitation counselors and experts. This is in part due, no doubt, to the fact that
the rehabilitation counselor must report not only to the sponsoring insurance company but
also to the Commission and to claimant. The rehabilitation counselor under such circum-
stances is less likely to be viewed as merely another partisan agent of the employer, as is
usually the case, rightly or wrongly, under the Pennsylvania practice. Interview which
Chuck Smolkin, CRC, Baltimore, Md (Feb 6, 1992). As discussed above, the Maryland sys-
tem also encourages cooperation in the rehabilitation effort. See note 374 and accompanying
text.
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I am writing with regard to a modified duty offer of employment
for you. As you know, you have been cleared for full-time seden-
tary employment by Dr. Smith. We have previously forwarded to
you his report, which was sent to our insurance carrier last week.
We also sent you a form listing the restrictions he has established
for you. He still doesn't think you can go back to your regular full-
time job loading the truck and doing your deliveries.
At the present time, we can offer you a job at the order and
solicitation desk, assisting me and Fred taking orders for our deliv-
eries to clients. You would be making and taking calls relative to
the next weeks' orders. You would not have to lift anything over
ten pounds. Further, you can sit down or stand up as you need
while you help us out. This job falls within the sedentary duty oc-
cupational category which Dr. Smith has authorized for you.
Mr. Claimant, I am ready to adjust the office and the job in case
you have any special problems which we can't foresee right now.
I'm flexible.
The pay for this job is $5.00 per hour. The hours are 7:00 a.m.
until 4:00 p.m., Monday thru Friday, and 8:00 a.m. until 12:00
noon on Saturdays.
If you want to come back to work at this job, please call Fred or
myself and he will put you on the schedule. You would be doing
this job at our office in Aliquippa on Sheffield Avenue.
I look forward to seeing you back to work with us.
Very truly yours,
James E. Boss
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